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Informality, Illegality, and Inequality
Jane E. Larsont
The history of countless nations illustrates how borderland regions frequently de-
part from the norms of interior zones.... Isolation, weak institutions, lax admini-
stration, and a different economic orientation prompt people on the periphery to de-
velop homemade approaches to their problems....
INTRODUCTION: FROM THE PERIPHERY TO THE CENTER
The United States-Mexico border historically has been characterized by its
isolation from the core of both nations. The United States side has viewed the
border as a place of lawlessness, poverty, backwardness, and ethnic difference,
physically and culturally distant from either the Midwestern "heartlands" or the
urban "melting pots. ' '2 Mexicans, too, traditionally dismissed their northern
borderlanders as pocho, tainted by their proximity to the United States.4 Mar-
garet Montoya captures the view from both sides: "Border towns everywhere
are different, incorporating the characteristics of the nation-states they link to-
gether, but nowhere are they as distinct from their respective core zones as




Once on the periphery of both nations, today the United States-Mexico bor-
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1. OSCAR MARTNEZ, TROUBLESOME BORDER 2 (1988).
2. To repeat the assessment is not to accept it uncritically.
3. Pocho is also used by Spanish speakers in the United States to describe a Mexican-American
who is overly Americanized in speech and culture. CHAD RICHARDSON, BATOS, BOLILLOS, POCHOS, &
PELADOS: CLASS AND CULTURE ON THE SOUTH TEXAS BORDER 2 (1999).
4. "Americans are largely unaware that Mexicans also view their northern border with concern, and
at times even alarm." Martinez, supra note 1, at I. Border communities, such as Ciudad Judrez and Ti-
juana have long been criticized from Mexico City and the interior for their close ties to the United
States. 1d.
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Sayles' Movie Lone Star, 27 N.M. L. REV. 223, 223 (1997).
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der is the vanguard of each country's experience of globalization. 6 As the
global context overtakes the nation-state, it is at the nation's points of contact
with the world-the margins, the edges, the boundaries-that the global be-
comes local. In the borderlands we are witnessing the invisible hands and vir-
tual realities of globalization manifest as material social forms.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls this process "localized globalism," or
"the specific impact of transnational practices and imperatives on local condi-
tions that are thereby destructured and restructured in order to respond to trans-
national imperatives." 7 The free-trade enclave of the maquilas is one familiar
localized globalism found at the border.8 Santos distinguishes such localized
globalism from "globalized localism," or "the process by which a given local
phenomenon is successfully globalized," such as the emergence of the English
language as an international language of business or the worldwide spread of
American music, fashion, and fast food.9
This idea of a plurality of "globalisms" helps explain an apparent paradox:
Why has the border's emergence as an important region for investment and
policy not transformed its social and economic marginality within the national
context? If one common idea of globalization is that the process unifies or ho-
mogenizes the world ("the global village"), Santos contends instead that glob-
alization replicates existing patterns of power and influence, with the core
countries specializing in globalized localisms and the peripheral countries in
6. The popular understanding of globalization tends to emphasize its economic impact, even to the
point of translating globalization as the worldwide ascendency of capitalism. See, e.g., THOMAS
FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 308 (1999) ("With the end of the Cold War, globalization
is globalizing Anglo-American-style capitalism") See also PIERRE BOURDIEU, ACTS OF RESISTANCE:
AGAINST THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET 34-38 (1998) (noting that the idea of globalization "ratifies
and glorifies the reign of what are called financial markets, in other words the return of a kind of radical
capitalism, with no other law than that of maximum profit, an unfettered capitalism without any dis-
guise, but rationalized, pushed to the limit of its economic efficacy by the introduction of modem forms
of domination.") Other definitions, however, reflect the wide-ranging expressions of globalization in
political, normative, social, and cultural realms. DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS:
POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE (1999) defines globalization as fundamental change in the terms
and context of social relations, "a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the
spatial organization of social relations and transactions-assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity,
velocity and impact-generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, inter-
action, and the exercise of power." Id. at 16. Anthony Giddens characterizes globalization processes as
"the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local
happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa." THE CONSEQUENCES OF
MODERNITY 64 (1990). Boaventura de Sousa Santos's work emphasizes globalization's local effects.
See TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION
258-68 (1995).
7. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights, 18
ZE1TSCHRIFT FUR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 1, 4-5 (1997). An expanded version of this essay under the same
title is found in MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY (Berta E. Hem~indez-Truyol, ed., forth-
coming 2001).
8. Other localized globalisms are deforestations and depletion of natural resources to pay for the
foreign debt; touristic use of historical treasures, wildlife, religious sites or ceremonies, and folk arts
and crafts; ecological dumping; conversion of sustainable agriculture into export agriculture as part of
structural adjustment; and the ethnicization of the workplace. Id.
9. Id.
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localized globalisms.'0 To extend his point, if the United States' southern bor-
der historically was an internal Third World, its experience of globalization can
be predicted to reinscribe its role on the periphery.
This prediction holds true. Notwithstanding economic development, the
liberalization and intensification of trade, and strategic geographical location,
the southern border is among the poorest regions of the United States. " More
than half of that international boundary links Mexico with the State of Texas,
and this is the most populated and economically vital stretch, with large trans-
border urban areas at Brownsville/Matamoros, McAllen/Reynosa, Rio Grande
City/Camargo, Laredo/Nuevo Laredo, and El Paso/Ciudad Judrez. 12 In recent
years, the Texas sides of these "twin cities" have been among the fastest grow-
ing areas in the United States. Between 1990 and 2000, the county surrounding
McAllen grew 48.5%, the county surrounding Laredo grew 44.9%, the county
surrounding Rio Grande City grew 32.3%, the county surrounding Brownsville
grew 28.9%, and the county surrounding El Paso grew 14.9%. 13 Yet as the bor-
der region grows, its poverty only increases. Thirty-five percent or more of
people living in the counties containing these burgeoning cities are poor, with
poverty rates for children 10% or more higher than the overall poverty rate.1
4
(This compares to 16.7% of people in poverty for the State of Texas (23.6% of
children), 15 and 13.3% in poverty for the nation as a whole.) 16 In 1980, by con-
trast, only 28% of people in these counties were poor.' 7 A state official aptly
captures the seeming paradox of the border's development as "growth without
prosperity.
' ' 8
10. Santos is invoking world systems theory, which divides the world into core and peripheral ar-
eas. World systems theory argues that peripheral areas are drawn into modem economic relations with
the core on terms that favor the core. See IMMANUEL WALLERSTEN, THE CAPITALIST WORLD-
ECONOMY 162 (1979).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 14-16. By comparison, the northern border of Mexico is a
relatively prosperous region of that country.
12. Nearly all people at the border are congregated in twin cities, urban areas that are physically
contiguous to one another on the opposite sides of the boundary line. Roberto Ham-Chande & John R.
Weeks, A Demographic Perspective of the U.S.-Mexico Border, in DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMICS OF THE
U.S.-MEXico BORDER at 1, 9 (John R. Weeks & Roberto Ham-Chande eds.,1992).
13. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICK FACTS (2000), available at
http://www.census.gov/servlet/BasicFactServlet (Sept. 27, 2001) [hereinafter CENSUS BUREAU].
14. In Cameron County (Brownsville), 35.3% of people and 45.2% of children are in poverty. Id.
In Hidalgo County (McAllen), 37.6% of people and 47.9% of children are in poverty. Id. In Starr
County (Rio Grande City), 46.7% of people and 56.4% of children are in poverty. Id. In Webb County
(Laredo), 32.6% of people and 42.3% of children are in poverty. Id. In El Paso County (El Paso), 27.8%
of people and 3 8.6% of children are in poverty. Id. These are 1997 model-based estimates, the most
recent available.
15. Id.
16. Id. Nineteen percent of the nation's children are in poverty. Id.
17. See LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, COLONIA HOUSING AND
INFRASTRUCTURE, CURRENT CHARACTERISTICS AND FUTURE NEEDS, POLICY RESEARCH PROJECT
REPORT NO. 124, at 10 (1997) [hereinafter COLONIA HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE].
18. The phrase comes from BORDERING THE FUTURE, REPORT OF TEXAS STATE COMPTROLLER OF
PUBLIC ACCOUNTS (July 1998), available at http://www.window.state.tx.us/borderborder.html.
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Among the border's "homemade approaches ' 9 to this growth without
prosperity has been the emergence of informal housing-unregulated settle-
ments known in the region as "colonias." In regional usage, a "colonia" is a
semi-rural subdivision of substandard housing that lacks basic physical infra-
structure, in particular, clean water, sanitary sewage or adequate roads. More
21than 1500 colonias have been identified within the United States, virtually all
of them in Texas.22 Colonias cluster around the state's booming border cities,
with 75% of the colonia population living in the counties surrounding
Brownsville, McAllen, Laredo, and El Paso, Texas.
23
Colonias are part of the large, growing and yet little-studied informal econ-
omy in the United States. Informal economic activity takes place outside the
structures of governmental regulation, in particular labor, tax, health and safety,
land use and environmental, civil rights, and immigration laws. Most colonia
settlements are extra-legal rather than illegal: When residents and developers
created existing colonias, subdivision and sale of rural land for residential con-
struction without provision of basic infrastructure or access to public services
was lawful, and no building codes set housing standards. Yet where the state
fails to regulate activities that in other settings are regulated according to ac-
cepted patterns, a kind of informality develops, albeit one built on legal and
material nonconformity rather than illegality.
24
One can observe informal housing production in the colonia pattern every-
where in urban areas of the developing world: In the Distrito Federal sur-
rounding Mexico City, for example, more than 40% of the population live in
colonias populares (popular housing) or fraccionamientos illegales (illegal
25subdivisions). Similar percentages are found elsewhere: "If we consider land
19. See the epigraph by Oscar Martinez. Supra note I and accompanying text.
20. The word in Spanish means simply "neighborhood," but has acquired the regional meaning
described in the text. The term now also has a legal definition that emphasizes border location and sub-
standard conditions. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 775.001(2) (Vernon Supp. 2001); TEX. WATER CODE
ANN. § 17.921(1) (Vernon 1999).
21. This Essay focuses on informal housing settlements inside the United States. There are also
thousands of such settlements along the Mexican side of the border. AUGUSTA DWYER, ON THE LINE:
LIFE ON THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER 2-5, 49-65 (1994). See generally LUIS ALBERTO URREA, ACROSS
THE WIRE: LIFE AND HARD TIMES ON THE MEXICAN BORDER (1993); LUIS ALBERTO URREA, BY THE
LAKE OF SLEEPING CHILDREN: THE SECRET LIFE OF THE MEXICAN BORDER (1996).
22. There are 1495 officially designated colonias within Texas. TEX. WATER DEV. BD., WATER
AND WASTEWATER SURVEY OF ECONOMICALLY DISTRESSED AREAS-DECEMBER 1996, available at
http://www.tdwb.state.tx.us [hereinafter TDWB REPORT-DECEMBER 1996]. The U.S. government has
identified about 15 other colonias in Doia Ana County, New Mexico, part of the El Paso-Las Cruces
metropolitan region. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-91-37, RURAL DEVELOPMENT:
PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF COLONIA SUBDIVISIONS NEAR MEXICO BORDER 1 (Nov. 1990) [herein-
after GAO REPORT].
23. 1 COLONIA HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 1.
24. The definition used here is supported by leading theorists of informality, see, e.g., Manuel
Castells & Alejandro Portes, World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and the Effects of the Infor-
mal Economy, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: STUDIES IN ADVANCED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
3, 12 (Alejandro Portes & Manuel Castells et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter THE INFORMAL ECONOMY].
25. William A. Doebele, Land Policy, in SHELTER, SETTLEMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT 110, 127
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tenure, infrastructure requirements and building standards, we find that an av-
erage of 40% and in some cases as much as 70% of the population of the major
cities are living in illegal conditions. ' ,26 Thus, most urban housing worldwide
develops outside of formal law and markets, either by means of land seizure or
squatting, or by nonconforming subdivision that falls short of regulatory stan-
dards.
Regardless of location, housing production in the informal sector centers
upon four principles: (1) the occupants do most of the work to construct a
house (often the terms "self-help" or "self-built" housing are used); (2) con-
structed housing takes a nonstandard form; (3) the settlements or subdivisions
into which the housing is clustered are illegal or nonconforming; and (4) the
financing for housing production comes from private capital invested outside of
formal credit markets or institutions.
27
Sociologists and anthropologists seek to capture the essence of informality
by focusing on its social particularities, observing, for example, operations that
are "small scale, labor intensive, requiring little capital, and locally based.,
28
These scholars observe that women, immigrants, and people of color are over-
represented in the informal economy, presumably because they are vulnerable
to exclusion from the formal economy. 29 Unpaid family labor, including child
labor, is common.
30
To date, informal housing has been studied almost exclusively as a phe-
nomenon of the developing world and not of the United States.31 Informal
housing is hardly recognized as a fact in this country,32 much less treated in
state policy as a legitimate means of housing production. Yet within our bor-
derlands, more than 400,000 people now live in the informal housing settle-
(Lloyd Rodwin, ed., 1987) (citing United Nations estimates of 40% in 1980).
26. Ed~sio Fernandes & Ann Varley, Law, the City and Citizenship in Developing Countries: An
Introduction, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3, 3 (Eddsio
Fernandes & Ann Varley, eds. 1998) [hereinafter ILLEGAL CITIES] (citing A. DURAN-LASSERVE & V.
CLERC, REGULARIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF IRREGULAR SETTLEMENTS: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE
(World Bank, UMP Working Paper No. 6 (1996)).
27. Adapted from a typology developed in MANUEL CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE GRASSROOTS:
A CROSS-CULTURAL THEORY OF URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 188-89 (1983).
28. Stuart Henry, The Political Economy of Informal Economies, 493 ANNALS, AM. ACAD. POL.
Soc. Sci. 137, 140 (1987).
29. Castells & Portes, supra note 24, at 12, 25. For example, there is a close association between
areas of high immigrant concentration and those places where the U.S. informal sector is most vigorous.
Id.
30. See, e.g., HENRY A. SELBY ET AL., THE MEXICAN URBAN HOUSEHOLD: ORGANIZING FOR
SELF-DEFENSE (1990).
3 1. The international literature on informal housing is large. A useful introduction and review is
CATHARINE FARVACQUE & PATRICK McAUSLAN, REFORMING URBAN LAND POLICIES AND
INSTITUTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1992).
32. But see PETER M. WARD, COLONIAS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN TEXAS AND MEXICO:
URBANIZATION BY STEALTH (1998); Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO.
L.J. 179 (1995); Guadalupe T. Luna, Agricultural Underdogs and International Agreements: The Legal
Context ofAgricultural Workers Within the Rural Economy, 26 N.M. L. REV. 9, 28-37 (1996).
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ments known as colonias.3 3 Further, growing evidence indicates that colonia-
type development is beginning to move away from the border into other parts
of Texas where low-wage labor, urbanization pressure, inadequate housing,
cheap land, and minimal land use regulation come together.34 Peter Ward
speculates that similar patterns of informal settlement and housing provision
may already exist throughout the United States, but that researchers have nei-
ther looked for such settlements, nor understood their character or significance
when researchers came upon them.
35
In an earlier work on the colonias, I predicted that working poor households
in the United States increasingly would turn to informal housing in order to
survive the lack of basic social provision, in particular the squeeze between
falling real wages and declining governmental support for either affordable
housing or income maintenance. 36 This economic "squeeze" has only tightened
throughout the 1990s, as policies of trade liberalization and government re-
straint in social welfare spending (all part of the globalization agenda) took
hold. The growth of colonias in Texas during these years provides further evi-
dence that informal housing production has emerged as a strategy for economic
survival inside the United States.
This essay extends that analysis, situating the growth of informal housing
within the broader context of globalization, and predicting that informal hous-
ing will continue to expand within the United States, moving beyond the bor-
derlands. If this proves true, the confounding problems of informality, like the
phenomenon itself, will move from the borderlands to the heartlands, and into
the mainstream of legal and policy debate. In anticipation of these develop-
ments, this essay examines the confounding relationship between informality
and the law.
The essay argues that fundamental values of legal culture stand in the way
of a productive engagement with informality in the United States. Informality
contradicts legality, and especially equality, as we conceive these values. From
33. According to state agencies, 392,188 people live in officially designated colonias within Texas.
TDWB REPORT-DECEMBER 1996, supra note 22. Much smaller populations live in comparable set-
tlements in Dofia Ana County, New Mexico, part of the El Paso-Las Cruces metropolitan region. In
1990, the General Accounting Office estimated the New Mexico colonia population to be 14,600 peo-
ple. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 1. These are official estimates; the population is likely larger. Jorge
Chapa et al., Enumeration, Housing Characteristics and Sampling Rates in the Colonias of the Texas
Border Area: A Perspective on Census Data, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, RES. CONF. ON UNDERCOUNTED
ETHNIC POPULATIONS, PROC. 247 (Washington, D.C.) (stating that colonia populations are likely to be
undercounted in census and other official counts).
34. A handful of colonias have been identified hundreds of miles away from the border near the
Texas cities of Houston and Austin. See LBJ SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, RESIDENTIAL LAND MARKET
DYNAMICS, ABSENTEE LOT OWNERS AND DENSIFICATION POLICIES FOR TEXAS COLONIAS 3 (2000).
35. For example, settlements of mobile and manufactured homes may be the colonia equivalent in
other regions of the country. Ward suggests we should begin speaking more generically of "substandard
subdivisions," rather than the regionally specific "colonia." Interview with Peter Ward, LBJ Sch. Pub.
Aff., U. Tex., Austin, Tex. (Oct. 11, 1999).
36. See Larson, supra note 32, at 246.
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within this tradition, informality is an abuse of law, as well as tolerance of ex-
ploitation and inequality. Accordingly, informality creates the best argument
for stepped-up regulation.
But under conditions of economic inequality, do ambitious and absolute
regulatory standards advance or frustrate social justice? Legal scholars who
wrestle with questions of poverty are just beginning to recognize this question
as unavoidable.3 7 This essay spotlights these preliminary and cautious inquiries,
and generalizes their significance. It presents a converging critique of unattain-
able standards naming existing models of regulation as one reason the poor
cannot provide for their basic needs. If these conventional legal strategies are
not re-examined in light of the widening disparities of wealth that accompany a
globalizing economy, the United States may be unable to avoid making unpro-
ductive, indeed unjust, policy even as informality grows.
This essay urges that regulatory policy in the United States support and
neither punish nor prohibit those who shelter themselves informally. Following
established terminology from the international literature, this strategy is termed
"regularization." Regularization is not a policy of wholesale deregulation. Nor
does it imply negotiated or discretionary enforcement of rules that otherwise
remain in general force. Instead, regularization scales back regulatory standards
for some populations, and "legalizes" some illegal housing conditions, in a
program aimed at encouraging self-help investment in shelter.
No level of government in this country follows a policy of regularization,
and to get there from here would require changes in conventional political
thinking as well as innovative reforms in law. Conventional regulation estab-
lishes universal standards and obliges full and immediate compliance. Regu-
larization, in contrast, sets standards relative to the means available to the
regulated, and enables flexible and general compliance, with the goal of pro-
gressive improvement rather than immediate, full and universal compliance.
Regularization is an alternative regulatory strategy pioneered in the developing
world and designed for conditions of extreme economic constraint.
What stands between the United States and such a policy? There will be
debates about whether regularization, or one of the established choices of
regulation or deregulation, is the best policy choice. This essay focuses instead
on the meta-level barriers to considering any alternative to these established
choices. Do "progressive" or "flexible" modes of regulation violate fundamen-
tal norms, specifically those of legality and equality, meaning these alternative
approaches could not be translated into the legal system of the United States?
As this essay casts the conflict, these are theoretical problems. But like
most legal issues, the conflict appears most vividly and urgently in practical
form. Accordingly, after setting out the theoretical tensions between legality,
37. See infra text accompanying notes 138-15 1.
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equality, and a progressive policy of regularization, this essay telescopes down
into a tight frame on a specific policy issue: Should the regulatory regime of
building codes be applied to the Texas colonias? The essay examines a pub-
lished exchange that I had with Richard Delgado on this question. Delgado be-
lieves that to accept lesser regulatory standards in the name of pragmatism or
opportunity may lend law's imprimatur to inequality. Thus, alternative models
like regularization carry an unacceptable price. This essay reaffirms a critique
of unattainable standards. To hold to formal equality in economic regulatory
standards and enforcement will harshly burden those already hardest pressed to
survive the new economic order.
This essay then expands out again, seeking to generalize the attributes of
the regularization policy in order to identify a new model for regulation under
conditions of extreme economic constraint, with the goal of finding a legal
technology appropriate for regulating the informal economy. For this purpose, I
borrow the "progressive realization" structure from international human rights
law as a new regulatory form. Progressive realization commits government and
the regulated to standards of adequate housing, but demands in compliance no
more than that the regulated commit the maximum available resources. This is
the meaning of equality under the alternative model. Compliance is always pos-
sible under the "maximum available resources" rule, and progress toward the
standard always demanded by the "progressive realization" rule. This is the
meaning of legality under the alternative model.
This essay proposes to build a domestic program for regulating housing
quality and land development around the progressive realization of standards.
Such a program would better balance the regulatory burden on diverse popula-
tions, the public interest in adequate housing, and an aspirational commitment
to elevating living standards in pursuit of social equality. Linked to a compre-
hensive program of regularization, progressive realization places law behind,
rather than against, the activities of informals, without sacrificing legality or
equality.
Progressive realization is not an easy idea to incorporate into our legal tra-
dition. Indeed, the United States has not adopted the international agreement
that created the concept,38 arguing that an obligation that creates anything short
of absolute and immediate compliance is not really "law." 39 Granting the con-
ceptual unfamiliarity of progressive realization, informality, too, is an unfamil-
iar problem. At the least, we must consider new legal strategies. For to consider
how law should respond to informality is to face a basic question of political
strategy in the brave new world of globalization: What does economic survival,
not to mention social emancipation, look like for those people simultaneously
38. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, 5.
39. See infra text accompanying note 215.
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at the vortex of global restructuring and yet marginalized within its new circuits
of power?
I. COLONIAS As INFORMAL HOUSING PRODUCTION.
There is no typical colonia; living conditions vary greatly depending on dif-
ferences in age, size, location, service provision, security of land tenure and ti-
tle, housing consolidation, settlement density, and community solidarity. But
there are commonalities, defined importantly by the ways in which these set-
tlements depart from the norms established by regulation in the United States
for land and housing development, and by formal markets for housing finance
and production. So, too, colonias follow the same dimensions of nonconformity
as informal housing settlements throughout the world. Thus, colonias are not an
ad hoc aberration peculiar to our borderlands, but rather a patterned alternative
to what the United States knows as the "normal" practices of housing develop-
ment. The following section explores this pattern of housing development, and
how it is expressed in the colonias.
Typically, informal housing settlements grow on cheap land at the distant
periphery of urban centers. Residents may bypass law altogether and squat on
the land, or purchase lots from developers in illegal or otherwise nonconform-
ing subdivisions. In either case, settlers and developers follow a conscious
strategy of avoiding regulation. Nonconformity with law is a means of gaining
access to land not otherwise available for development, and access to housing
not otherwise affordable for the settler population.
Upon acquiring land, the settlers move quickly to construct temporary
housing. Any improvements on the land, however provisional, manifest the
settlers' determination, despite legal uncertainties, to retain the land and de-
velop it as housing. This "signaling" begins a nuanced political negotiation
with the government and with public opinion. At this stage, the new occupants
cannot claim good title, leaving their investment of time, labor, money and
materials vulnerable. Yet, they must risk enough to force a political accommo-
dation of their interests. Their goal is to prevent public authorities from en-
forcing existing regulations to evict, block the settlement, or control building
patterns, or moving to enact new rules that would increase shelter costs before
the residents have time to build.
After settlers make an initial claim by establishing and occupying a tempo-
rary shelter, the household begins the slow process of "consolidating" a perma-
nent dwelling. Settlers typically build piecemeal, with the household providing
both labor and capital. Self-builders usually have some construction skills, but
not always technical expertise: When they build, they often use nonstandard
materials, a shell of an existing structure of uncertain quality (such as a trailer
or a shack), or improvised plans. As incremental construction progresses,
money and time pressures may lead to further down-sizing or cutting of cor-
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ners. Settlers purchase materials as money becomes available; when money is
tight, the work stops. This kind of housing construction can take many years to
complete, and families often live in provisional housing on a semi-permanent
40basis. The resulting permanent structures rarely meet conventional building
codes, and may endanger the family's safety and health. The speed of housing
consolidation depends, obviously, upon household income, but also upon secu-
rity of tenure41 and the rate at which public services such as water and waste-
water come on line.42 Where land costs are high or are increasing, a newly-
settling household may never "graduate" from a temporary to permanent shel-
ter, and housing quality deteriorates further.
Due to their unregulated character, informal settlements, at their inception,
usually lack access to water and sewer hookups, leading to improvised and in-
adequate solutions for the storage of drinking water, and the disposal of human
waste. Perhaps more than any other aspect of nonconformity, water and waste
problems threaten family and public health.
Depending on governmental policy, informal settlements may or may not
gradually "regularize," shedding their illegal or nonconforming status and ac-
quiring basic services and infrastructure. Regularization policies typically in-
volve two components: Juridical or legal regularization clears or confers formal
legal title to the land, and physical regularization provides infrastructure and
access to public services. If the land was squatted or otherwise acquired with-
out purchase, the government must step in to acquire the land by voluntary sale
or eminent domain, and thereby establish the legal basis for transfer of title to
individual lot-holders. Where land was purchased but the development does not
conform to applicable land use regulations, the developer and/or settlers must
bring the settlement into conformity or get it excepted from the law, or the gov-
ernment must change the law itself to reflect the reality.
Either coincident with or following legal regularization, governments may
physically regularize the settlement by gradual provision and upgrading of a
basic level of public services such as drinking water, sewage, street lighting,
police and fire protection, roads, transportation links, etc. Some governments
also facilitate housing consolidation as part of regularization programs, pro-
viding subsidized credit, technical support, and access to materials for self-
builders/owners.4 3
40. See Peter Ward, The Practice and Potential of Self-Help Housing in Mexico City, in SELF-
HELP HOUSING: A CRITIQUE 175 (Peter Ward ed., 1982).
41. As used in this essay, the term "tenure" refers to the mode or system of holding lands or an
interest in real property. Secure tenure, therefore, is the right to hold land that is recognized by the state
and can be defended effectively against other claimants.
42. There is debate in the international development literature about the extent to which secure
legal title is a predictor of housing investment in informal housing. See generally Stephen E. Hendrix,
Myths of Property Rights, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 183 (1995); Ann Varley, The Political Uses of
Illegality: Evidence from Urban Mexico, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 26, at 172-90.
43. For a detailed description of varying regularization approaches, see ALAN GILBERT & PETER
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This approach to housing production reverses what residents of the devel-
oped world know as the "normal" sequence of land and housing development,
which begins with planning, followed by servicing, and concluding with hous-
ing construction. In informal housing, the homebuilding comes first, and eve-
rything else follows.
The Texas colonias developed by this pattern. A regulatory vacuum existed
until 1995, allowing the development of substandard subdivision and self-
building.44 Rural land fell within the jurisdiction of counties rather than nearby
municipalities. The State of Texas had traditionally delegated few powers to
county governments to regulate either subdivision or housing quality, and de-
nied the counties any power to plan or zone. Thus, developers acted entirely
within the law when they bought and subdivided agricultural land outside (but
close to) border cities, offering unimproved half- and quarter-acre parcels for
sale to families willing to build their own shelter and do without piped water,
flush toilets, and paved roads.45 Developing a colonia in this legal setting meant
little more than buying a field, drawing a grid, grading a few dirt roads, and
opening a sales office.
Since 1995, Texas has tightened subdivision requirements with the express
aim of blocking new colonias and growth in existing settlements. Most colonia
subdivisions now existing developed in the pre-1995 period, although new
buyers continue to move into empty lots in established subdivisions. Develop-
ers have added few new subdivisions under the post-1995 rules; simply put, the
stricter regulations have priced the buyer population out of the market.
To date, housing quality in colonias remains unregulated. Most self-
builders strive to achieve a brick- or concrete-block bungalow surrounded by a
fence with access to water, wastewater, and electricity. 46 Yet the incremental
process of owner-construction often begins with a provisional shelter in the
form of a used trailer or mobile home, or a shack. Such shelter is often unsafe,
overcrowded, or otherwise inadequate to family needs. The family slowly con-
structs the permanent structure nearby or even around the shell of the provi-
sional structure. Lack of adequate water or sewer service undermines housing
M. WARD, HOUSING, THE STATE AND THE POOR: POLICY AND PRACTICE IN THREE LATIN AMERICAN
CITIES (1985). See also sources cited supra note 26.
44. Within city boundaries Texas law conventionally regulates housing development, with re-
quirements for provision of public services and infrastructure and for housing quality. This is true even
of Houston, notable as the only large city in the United States that does not have conventional planning
or zoning. See Larson, supra note 32, at 181-82 & n. 11.
45. For a detailed account of the regulatory setting in which the Texas colonias emerged, see id. at
197-205. In some transactions, developers fraudulently promised buyers future access to water, sewer,
and other services and infrastructure. See id. at 193-94. In the greater proportion of sales, however, buy-
ers were fully aware of the tradeoff they were being offered. Id. at 194-95. Research suggests they did so
with the expectation that the government could be politically mobilized at some future date to meet
community infrastructure needs. Id. This expectation is based in part on familiarity with the housing
policies and practices of Mexico, in which regularization of informal housing is the norm. Id.
46. Id. at 191-93.
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quality. The resulting poor environmental conditions spread diseases such as
dysentery, diarrhea, hepatitis, and cholera. Residents without water or sewer
hookups improvise by drilling shallow wells, purchasing water and storing it,
or taking water from nearby irrigation ditches. Human waste may be disposed
of in a pit privy, outhouse, or by septic system.47
While the regulatory climate favored development, colonias grew exponen-
tially. Researchers have traced the first colonias in Texas to the 1950s and early
1960s, but physical isolation made these early settlements largely invisible for
many years. Colonias grew at a steady pace throughout the 1970s, but their rate
of growth exploded in the 1980s. The state first attempted to survey colonia
populations in the late 1980s, but did not attempt a population count.48 In 1990
the General Accounting Office, a research arm of Congress, reported 198,000
residents in 842 colonias located in six Texas border counties.49 By 1993 the
count was 250,000-300,000 people in 1100 colonias, 50 and by 1996, 340,000
people in more than 1400 settlements.5 1 The 2000 Census counts will likely re-
veal further growth, notwithstanding the no-growth policies in force.
During these years of open development before the 1995 moratorium,
quarter-to-half-acre colonia lots cost an average $100 down and $50-
$150/month for an ultimate purchase price of $10,000-$12,000. Sellers con-
veyed lots by means of contract for deed, an installment arrangement for the
purchase of land similar to a "rent-to-own" arrangement, offering seller fi-
nancing backed by the powerful remedy of forfeiture. 52 Interest rates were high,
averaging 12 to 14%. The contract for deed mechanism worked by creating a
source of financing for very low-income buyers otherwise priced out of formal
credit markets. 53 Median household income in the Texas counties with concen-
trated colonia development ranges from $14,000 to $26,000, 54 about half of the
47. d. at 185-91.
48. TEX. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, THECOLONIASFACTBOOK 1-4 tbl.la (1988).
49. GAO REPORT, supra note 22.
50. Chapa et al., supra note 33, at 247.
51. TDWB REPORT-DECEMBER 1996, supra note 22.
52. The buyer takes immediate possession of the property and begins to make monthly payments,
but does not get legal title or realize any equity in the property until the final installment has been paid.
Should the buyer miss a payment, the seller can retake possession of the property, retain all payments
previously made, and also resell the forfeited property at full price to another buyer.
53. In addition to offering financing, colonia developers shaped their collections practices to the
local economy, offering contract-for-deed buyers flexibility in monthly payments. This is not typical
business practice for formal credit institutions, including governmental lenders who target their pro-
grams towards low-income borrowers. Such flexibility is necessary for the significant part of the colonia
population who earn income only seasonally and/or migrate for work with long absences from home.
For their part, developers may be all too willing to delay payments, which simply allows them to earn
interest on interest. It is not uncommon for a colonia buyer to make payments for years only to find he
or she owes more than the original amount of the debt.
54. Median household income (estimated for 1997, the most recent figures available) for Cameron
County (Brownsville) is $21,699, for Hidalgo County (McAllen) is $20,034, for Starr Country (Rio
Grande City) is $14,178, for Webb County (Laredo) is $23,386, and for El Paso County (El Paso) is
$25,866. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 13.
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per-capita income for the rest of the nation.55
In recent years, the state56 and federal57 governments have moved to pro-
vide water and wastewater service to existing colonias. These projects bring
public services to many settlements, in particular the largest, most populous and
easily accessible colonias. But at current funding levels, as many as 40% of
residents of existing colonias may never be reached. 58 With the remedial focus
on physical dimensions of these substandard settlements that cause broader en-
vironmental, public health and sanitation problems, other more localized depri-
vations that plague colonia residents, such as lack of garbage collection, street
lighting, storm sewers and other flood control, and fire and emergency protec-
tion, have not been a policy priority. Services that would draw the colonias into
the political and economic life of the municipalities they surround also have not
been pursued, notably street paving or provision of public transport. Programs
to address the social marginality and poverty of colonia residents exist, if at all,
mostly through the efforts of non-governmental organizations. Even the legal
definition of "colonia" adopted in Texas law focuses on inadequacy of water
supply or sewer service, and not the other indicia of deprivation typical of a
substandard subdivision.59
With the problem thus constructed as a technical one of bringing in water
and wastewater, and with future growth stopped, government officials can in-
sist they are spending tax dollars to address a one-time emergency. Colonia
policy in Texas does not represent any ongoing policy commitment to housing
the poor. Government accepted the need to provide water and wastewater aid to
existing communities only, and only on condition that local governments pre-
55. Median household income for the United States in 2000 is $42,148. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2000 (2001) (data from the annual income supple-
ment to the Current Population Survey). The federal government considers a family of five to be in pov-
erty if household income is less than $20,819, and for a family of six, $23,528. CENSUS BUREAU, supra
note 13.
56. In 1989, the Texas legislature created the Economically Distressed Areas Program ("EDAP"), a
project administered by the Texas Water Development Board. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 17.921-935
(Vernon 2000). The program provides financial assistance to bring water and wastewater services to
areas such as colonias. The price tag for EDAP has gradually increased, with $600 million in public
money already pledged, and another $400-500 million estimated as needed but not yet appropriated.
57. The Cranston-Gonzales National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 requires that the state set
aside 10% of its Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) allocation towards projects for colonia
areas located within 150 miles of the U.S.-Mexican border, Now called the CDBG Colonia Fund, the
10% set-aside is permanent. More than 75% of these funds are being use to provide water and waste-
water system improvements. I COLONIA HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 76-77 & tbl
4.2.
58. TDWB REPORT-DECEMBER 1996, supra note 22.
59. According to Texas statute, "'Colonia' means a geographic area that: (A) is an economically
distressed area... ; and (B) is located in a county any part of which is within 50 miles of an international
border." TEX. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 775.001(2) (Vernon 2001). "'Economically distressed area' means
an area in which: (A) water supply or sewer services are inadequate to meet minimal needs of residen-
tial users. . .; (B) financial resources are inadequate to provide water supply or sewer services that will
satisfy those needs; and (C) an established residential subdivision was located on June 1, 1989 ......
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 17.921 (1) (Vernon 2000).
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vent any future colonia growth through demanding regulation and aggressive
enforcement. For example, a water and wastewater project cannot receive
funding if its home county has not adopted model subdivision rules. By these
model rules, no new residential subdivision may be approved without the de-
veloper providing access to water, sewage, and drainage before selling any
lot.61 Now, counties have the power to cancel an already-approved subdivision
if it is likely to be developed without infrastructure, and to require replatting
62
under the tougher new rules.
63
Thus, the new colonia regulatory package has two goals: stopping new
growth and modestly regularizing the physical configuration of existing settle-
ments. The government openly aims the no-growth component at colonias, and
not at regulating real estate development more generally. The tougher devel-
opment requirements apply only to colonias and only in the border region, 64
leaving the rest of Texas free to pursue its historic hostility to land use regula-
65tion. Away from the border, rural development in Texas remains virtually un-
regulated, and neither developers nor buyers of land and housing in these areas
bear the burden of higher costs associated with the new standards.
II. THE HIGH COST OF OPPORTUNITY
Informality is a strategy by which people exploit themselves as a means of
creating economic opportunity not otherwise available. This is a disconcerting
concept, particularly when voiced in a celebratory, as opposed to critical, tone.
The lack of economic opportunity for which informality compensates often re-
sults from discriminatory exclusion or marginalization. Women, immigrants,
and people of color, for example, are overrepresented in all sectors of the in-
formal economy because they are vulnerable to exclusion from the formal
economy.
6 6
Consistent with this pattern, non-whites, the poor, and immigrants dominate
60. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 17.924 (Vernon 2000).
61. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. §232.023 (Vernon 2001). The Model Subdivision Rules, TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. § 16.343 (Vernon 2000), require that land subdivided into lots of five acres or less
(modified from one acre or less in 1991) must provide adequate water and sewer infrastructure.
62. To "plat" a subdivision means to create a map that shows the location and boundaries of indi-
vidual parcels of land subdivided into lots, with streets, easements, etc. also located. Texas statute de-
fines "plat" as follows: "'Plat' means a map, chart, survey, plan, or replat containing a description of the
subdivided land with ties to permanent landmarks or monuments." TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§232.021(8) (Vernon 2001). A plat is registered in the deed records of a governmental jurisdiction. Ju-
risdictions require proof of conformity with applicable subdivision regulations before the plat may be
filed. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE §232.023. To require "replatting" allows the county to enforce tougher
subdivision regulations retrospectively.
63. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE § 232.040.
64. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE §232 subch. B. Subdivision Platting Requirements in County near
International Border imposes the development requirements and specifies they apply only to border
counties.
65. See Larson, supra note 32, at 197-205.
66. See Castells & Portes, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY, supra note 24, at 26.
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the colonia population. Latina/os comprise 82% of colonia residents, 67 com-
68pared to 32% of Texas residents and 12.5% of the nation. But this is not a
foreign or undocumented population; to the contrary, 85% of colonia residents
are citizens and three quarters were born in the United States.69 Yet, many are
first- or second-generation immigrants who retain strong ties to Mexico.
The increase in accessibility of the housing market due to colonia develop-
ment is worth remarking: Eighty-five percent of colonia households own their
own homes, 70 compared to a national home ownership rate of 66.8% for house-
holds of all income levels, and 45.5% for Hispanics. 7] When comparing simi-
larly poor neighborhoods, the effect is even more striking: Nationally, only
7227% of very low income families with children own their own homes.
By other measures, researchers have shown that colonias make housing
much more affordable to poor families: Only twenty percent of households in
areas of Texas with colonias face excessive housing costs compared 23% in ar-
73
eas of the state without colonias. The effect is even greater among the ex-
tremely poor, with a smaller percentage of extremely poor households in the
border counties facing unaffordable housing costs compared to similar families
statewide. Sixty-seven percent of those across the state earning less than
$10,000 per year pay excessive housing costs, but only 50% of equally poor
households in the border counties with concentrated colonia development bear
a similar burden. And there are many more extremely poor households in the
border region: Only sixteen percent of Texas households earn less than $10,000
per year, compared to 35% of households in the border counties.
74
Colonias may exist because they create housing opportunity, but they do so
by avoiding regulation and all its protections. Colonia land sales have been at
once exploitative and accessible. Economically marginal buyers can access af-
fordable single-family housing, as well as a means of financing that purchase,
but only at high interest rates and without basic consumer protections. Like-
wise, although land use regulation and building codes would lift living condi-
tions, the families who buy into existing colonias could not afford that better-
quality housing and environment. Land costs in the new subdivisions devel-
67. 1 COLONIA HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 38.
68. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 13. Colonia populations are not always markedly more Hispanic
than the cities they surround: Cameron County (Brownsville) is 84.3% Hispanic; Hidalgo County
(McAllen) is 88.3% Hispanic; Starr County (Rio Grande City) is 97.5% Hispanic; Webb County
(Laredo) is 94.3% Hispanic; and, El Paso County (El Paso) is 78.2% Hispanic. Id.
69. 1 COLONIA HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 38.
70. Chapa et al., supra note 33, at 266.
71. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND
RESEARCH, ISSUE BRIEF Ii 3 (2000) [hereinafter HUD ISSUE BRIEF II].
72. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, URBAN POLICY BRIEF No. 2 (Aug. 1995)
at http://www.huduser.org/publications/urbaff/upb2.html [hereinafter HUD URBAN POLICY BRIEF No.
2].
73. 1 COLONIA HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 13, 28.
74. Id. at 13.
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oped under the tough new requirements are so high, in fact, that many families
cannot invest in housing construction after making monthly payments on the
lot. As a result, housing quality is declining further, with more trailers and
fewer houses evident.
75
Informality creates opportunity, but also limits it. Houses not built to code
are not insurable, which exposes households to the threat of catastrophic loss.
The contract for deed arrangement makes ownership legally uncertain, as do
the irregular business practices of colonia developers. Finance institutions will
not make home equity loans in colonias due to the uncertainty over ownership,
which prevents self-builders from taking out loans against the property for im-
provements, even when they have a long record of timely payment under the
contract for deed. Without clean title, many families put their life savings into
houses that cannot easily be sold except in intra-colonia land markets, where
prices will not match fair market value.
Home-ownership for the middle class in the United States is a wealth-
accumulating investment, and also a basis for credit. By leveraging their in-
vestment, a middle-class family may move up into a better home or fund a ma-
jor life opportunity, such as a child's education, a small business, or a secure
retirement. Because of the legal uncertainty that currently accompanies infor-
mality, colonia housing investment cannot serve the same functions for poor
families. 76
III. INFORMALITY IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
The growth of informality is evident in the United States not only in hous-
ing, but in other economic sectors as well. Social scientists have documented
substantial informal labor, production, and commerce in goods and services in
this country, including unlicensed street vendors,77 garment sweatshops,78 of-
75. Interview with David Arizmendi, Proyecto Azteca, in San Juan, Tex. (Aug. 4, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter Arizmendi Interview].
76. Melvin L. Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro in Black Wealth, White Wealth: A New Perspective
on Racial Inequality (1997), and Dalton Conley in Being Black, Living in the Red: Race, Wealth, and
Social Policy in America (1999), argue that a family's ability to leverage investment in a house is
closely linked to their human and social capital investment. Lack of such an asset among racial minority
groups, they argue, is a significant determinant of enduring class division along racial lines in the
United States.
77. Regina Austin has written extensively about informal economic activity in the urban African-
American community, focusing on street vending. Regina Austin, "An Honest Living"? Street Ven-
dors, Municipal Regulation, and the Black Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 2119 (1994); Regina Austin,
"A Nation of Thieves ": Securing Black People's Right To Shop and To Sell in White America, 1994
UTAH L. REV. 147; Regina Austin, "The Black Community, "I ts Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identi-
fication, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1807-11 (1992). Related work on Mexican and Mexican-American
street vendors in El Paso, Texas, is KATHLEEN STAUDT, FREE TRADE? INFORMAL ECONOMIES AT THE
U.S.-MEXICo BORDER (1998), and on African immigrant street vendors in New York City is Rosemary
J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches to Law and Society in Condi-
tions of Globalization, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 791 (1998).
78. See Fermdndez-Kelly & Garcia, supra note 24, at 247 (garment industries of Los Angeles and
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fice- and house-cleaners,7 9 homeworkers, and home manufacturing enter-
prises.
81
Saskia Sassen contends the informal economy and the global economy are
intrinsically linked.82 The dominant portrait of the global economy spotlights
highly-skilled, well-paid professionals and the liberation of capital, informa-
tion, and communication from the bounds of time and place. Sassen points out
that the vast infrastructure of material support for this new economy, a support
structure rooted in time and place, and serviced by a low-wage and increasingly
female and immigrant workforce, remains in the shadows. These workers rep-
resent the globalization of labor at the lower end of the economy, according to
Sassen, a parallel to the globalization of capital in the economy's upper eche-
lons. 8
3
As the social distance between high- and low-wage workers grows (and this
trend continues despite high rates of economic growth and wealth creation),84
we can expect informality to expand. Households cannot subsist on below-
poverty wages and must find ways to supplement their income, often by work-
ing off-the-books. Similarly, households cannot afford goods and services pro-
duced and sold in the formal economy, and so support a parallel economy of
street vendors, peddlers, and flea markets. Housing, the single greatest con-
sumer expense of families, will not escape this economic squeeze, or the strate-
gies for surviving it.
The poor are already mostly excluded from formal sector markets in hous-
ing finance or construction, and hence from home ownership. 85 Even rental
markets have become mostly unaffordable 86 to low-wage workers, particularly
those with families. Despite a period of strong economic growth and declining
Miami); Alex Stepick, Miami 's Two Informal Sectors, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY, supra note 24, at
111 (referencing the Miami garment industry).
79. See Pierette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Regulating the Unregulated?: Domestic Workers' Social Net-
works, 41 SOC. PROBS. 50 (1994) (regarding immigrant housecleaners); Christian Zlolniski, The Infor-
mal Economy in an Advanced Industrialized Society: Mexican Immigrant Labor in Silicon Valley, 103
YALE L.J. 2305 (1994) (regarding immigrant office cleaners).
80. See Jagna Sharff, The Underground Economy of a Poor Neighborhood, in CITIES OF THE
UNITED STATES 19 (Leith Mullings ed., 1987) (discussing the activities of underground economy in
Latina/o community on Lower East Side of Manhattan).
81. See Saskia Sassen-Koob, New York City's Informal Economy, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY,
supra note 24, at 74 (describing basement furniture manufacturer).
82. See SASKIA SASSEN, CITIES IN A WORLD ECONOMY at 121-23 (1994)
83. See SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: ESSAYS ON THE NEW MOBILITY
OF PEOPLE AND MONEY 79 (1998) [hereinafter GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS].
84. See Frank Levy & Richard J. Mumane, U.S. Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality A Re-
view of Recent Trends and Proposed Explanations, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1333 (1992); U.S DEPT.
OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE EARNINGS LADDER (1994).
85. The national home ownership rate is 66.8% for households of all income levels, see HUD
ISSUE BRIEF III, supra note 71, but only 27% for very low income families with children. See HUD
URBAN POLICY BRIEF BRIEF No. 2, supra note 72.
86. The generally accepted standard for affordability established by Congress and HUD is 30% of
income spent on housing costs.
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unemployment in the late 1990s, the gap between the number of struggling
families and the number of rental units affordable to them grew. 87 Only one of
every three families at or below 30% of median income can find a rental unit
that is both available and affordable. 88 Poor families pay an average of 58% of
their income for housing. 89 Homelessness persists. In the year 2000, the U.S.
Conference of Mayors reported a 17% surge of demand for emergency shelter
housing, with families the population most affected. 90 The causes include lack
of affordable housing and low-paying jobs. 91 Where land is available, where
household solidarity makes family labor available, and where laws are loose
enough or enforcement can be negotiated, self-help housing provides one solu-
tion.
Although the ethnographic and theoretical literature on informal labor, pro-
duction, and commerce inside the United States grows,92 researchers have
hardly examined informal housing. 93 By contrast, since the 1970s scholars have
vigorously investigated the informal housing sector of major cities of the de-
veloping world. These studies presume, explicitly or implicitly, that informal
housing production coincides with the particularities of the economy, society,
and politics in developing nations. In explaining the "illegal city," scholars
have pointed to (1) the limited resources of governments in developing coun-
tries, (2) legal cultures in which rules are often seen as symbolic or aspirational,
87. See generally NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION/LIHIS, OUT OF REACH: THE
GROWING GAP BETWEEN HOUSING COSTS AND INCOME OF POOR PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES (2000).
88. And two out of three of all poor families live in housing that costs more than they can afford.
NANCY 0. ANDREWS, HOUSING AFFORDABILITY AND INCOME MOBILITY FOR THE POOR: A REVIEW OF
TRENDS AND STRATEGIES, MEETING AMERICA'S HOUSING NEEDS 2 [hereinafter HOUSING
AFFORDABILITY].
89. See id. at 2.
90. U.S. CONFERENCE ON MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN
AMERICA'S CITIES, 2000: A 25-CITY SURVEY 40 (Dec. 2000), available at
www.mayors.org/uscm/hungersurvey/hunger2000.pdf.
91. Id.
92. Analysts of informality in other countries do include housing as a sector. E.g., HERNANDO DE
SOTO, THE OTHER PATH 17-57 (June Abbott trans., 1989); Allan Gilbert, Introduction to HOUSING AND
LAND IN URBAN MEXICO (Allan Gilbert ed., 1989).
93. Even where such housing issues are examined, they are not conceptualized as "informal hous-
ing production," and so the links between related housing practices are not understood. For example,
the efforts of the urban homeless to erect semi-permanent shelters should be understood as a struggle to
produce housing informally, and the determination of police to stop them an expression of state policy
towards informality. See Gregory Townsend, Cardboard Castles. The Fourth Amendment's Protection
of The Homeless's Makeshift Shelters in Public Areas, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 223 (1999). Such efforts are
criminalized in U.S. cities, typically by trespass where the property occupied is private, and by munici-
pal ordinances prohibiting "camping" or "loitering" where the property is public. See generally Mafia
Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and Its Criminalization, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. I
(1996). Urban squatting, another informal housing practice, has never involved large numbers of people
in this country, although it is important elsewhere in both developed and developing countries. On
squatting in the U.S., see, e.g., Seth Borgos, Low-Income Homeownership and the ACORN Squatters
Campaign, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 428 (Rachel G. Bratt, Chester Hartman & Ann
Meyerson, eds., 1986); Brian Gardiner, Squatters' Rights And Adverse Possession: A Search For Eq-
uitable Application of Property Laws, 8 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 119, 141-48 (1997) (focusing on
New York City and Los Angeles).
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and enforcers routinely bend the rules, and (3) political systems that lack
meaningful accountability to the needs of the majority. 94 By inference, then, the
rich and democratic countries that dominate the world economy and politics
should be able to house their poor, enforce their laws, and make everyone play
by the same set of rules. In sum, the conditions for informal settlement should
not exist in the United States. This essay shows that informal housing does ex-
ist (and more than just marginally) in the United States. Thus, these conven-
tional explanations cannot be fully adequate.
Policymakers commonly explain the Texas colonias as a Mexican pattern
of settlement imported to the United States by Mexican immigrants. Although
Mexican immigrants and those living in the bi-cultural world of the border have
a distinct repertoire of survival strategies (one which includes familiarity with
the idea of self-help housing), colonias did not emerge at the border because
the border is culturally "other. ' ,95 Instead, we find informal housing at the bor-
der because this is the region of the United States most altered by the force of
globalization. "Border urban areas are especially sensitive barometers of
change because it is here that prevailing methods of production and patterns of
consumption take spatial expression."
96
The colonias are a structural response to the globalization of the U.S. econ-
omy, and its parallel effects of diminishing wages for labor and discouraging
public investment in both housing and income maintenance. As such, there is
nothing either temporary or aberrational about this housing pattern. Kathleen
Staudt suggests that the turn to the informal economy (what she calls "the
Mexican solution") will not be confined to the border region in the coming
years:
Globalization has enveloped the border area, but the demography and political
economy of the border may spread to the heartlands. With more [empirical] studies
... , we will learn whether globalization, and its attendant consequences, like
94. See Antonio Azuela & Emilio Duhau, Tenure Regularization, Private Property and Public
Order in Mexico, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 26, at 157 ("As long as a substantial part of the popu-
lation gains access to land by a different set of processes from the rest of society, it is clear that not all
individuals are subject to the same rules, regardless of whether or not those rules can be formally classi-
fied as 'law.' It is hard to think of cases where this does not entail the existence of profound social ine-
qualities.").
95. Other groups of working poor in the United States rely on informal housing. What are known
as colonias in Texas are called "wildcat subdivisions" elsewhere, and are populated largely by whites.
See, e.g., Mark Robichaux, Just Deserts?: Arizona's Rural Sprawl, THE WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2001, at
1. Trailer parks located in peri-urban areas occupy the same economic niche as colonia housing, with
many of the same problems of substandard conditions. See, e.g., David Kelly, Busts ofIllegal Trailer
Parks to Halt; County Heeds Protests on Behalf of Coachella Valley Farm Workers, THE PRESS-
ENTERPRISE, Jan. 7, 1999, at B I. Overcrowding of apartments ("doubling-up") and illegal apartments
carved out of basements or cellars are common forms of urban informal housing, but are clandestine
practices, and thus difficult to investigate and assess as means of housing production.
96. Rebecca Morales & Jesus Tamayo-Sinchez, Urbanization and Development of the United
States-Mexico Border, in CHANGING BOUNDARIES IN THE AMERICAS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S.-
MEXICAN, CENTRAL AMERICAN AND SOUTH AMERICAN BORDERS 49, 49 (Lawrence A. Herzog ed.,
1992).
Yale Law & Policy Review
downsizing, insufficient job opportunities, and informality, will in fact reproduce
border life elsewhere. Is the "Mexican solution". . . taking hold beyond the border?
I believe that it is, and that this solution is a global one, as households respond to
structural adjustment.
97
If informality increases and spreads, the problem of appropriate regulatory
response can no longer can be sidestepped. Many policy models exist. Mexico,
for example, has built its current housing and social policy around informal
housing production, abandoning an earlier prohibitionist stance that treated
these settlements as illegal social ills to be eradicated. Mexico now not only
tolerates informal housing, but seeks to stimulate its production. National, state,
and local governments recognize the self-help settlements as a legitimate re-
sponse to housing shortages and as a productive form of economic investment.
The Mexican state offers regularization to such settlements in order to incorpo-
rate the housing and its residents into the urban fabric and the society, econ-
omy, and polity.98 Many other countries of the developing world have put in
place similar policies.
99
Such a policy approach has multiple goals, including solving the housing
crisis for the working class, assuring social peace, and building political sup-
port. Although ex post provision of legal title and basic services costs more
than systematically planned development, the mobilization of residents' sweat
equity and contribution of user fees, as well as the increase in property values
eventually reflected in tax revenues, ameliorate some of the expense of this
policy. Informal housing has become so common in Mexico that it has gen-
erated political movements. 10 1 Such activism by "informals" ameliorates the
disenfranchisement that living outside the law and accepted norms can repre-
sent in societies like our own where such activity remains clandestine for fear
of prosecution, or stigmatized as criminal, marginal or pitiful.
In this country, to date, only border-state lawmakers have faced the practi-
cal as well as theoretical problem of whether to embrace or resist informal
housing on a large scale. In the 1980s and 1990s, Texas, in particular, lacked
the luxury of critical inquiry or extended debate before finding itself with an
97. Staudt, supra note 77, at 90.
98. The Mexican politics of informal housing has shifted towards bureaucratization and principles
of entitlement. Under the PRI in its heyday, regularization was a political process, with public services
extended to communities whose leaders disrupted the peace or promised political support. More re-
cently, regularization has been routinized, with residents' labor contributions and user fees rather than
politics determining eligibility. Staudt, supra note 77, at 124-26 (describing PAN administration in Ci-
udad Juirez); Peter M. Ward, Political Pressure for Urban Services: The Response of Two Mexico City
Administrations, 12 DEV. & CHANGE 379 (1991) (comparing two PRI administrations in Mexico City).
99. See generally GEOFFREY PAYNE, URBAN LAND TENURE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A REVIEW (1997); Farvacque & McAuslan, supra note 31.
100. See generally Gareth Jones & Peter Ward, Privatizing the Commons: Reforming the Ejido
and Urban Development in Mexico, 22 INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL DEV. 76, 81-82 (1998).
101. See Staudt, supra note 77, at 65 (discussing the political strength and visibility of collective
organizations of informal workers).
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informal housing sector so visible, so fast-growing, and with such urgent needs
that legal and policy response could not be postponed. Texas adopted a morato-
rium policy that aimed to block the growth of any new colonias. The state also
embarked on an expensive, but nonetheless limited, remedial program to ad-
dress the worst physical deprivations of existing colonias. The overall thrust of
the state's policy was to position the colonias as a temporary problem, the
equivalent of large homeless shelters, and not permanent housing for a perma-
nent and growing low-wage labor force essential to the region's free-trade
economy.
One can easily criticize Texas's policy from a distance. But if the analysis
of the effects of globalization that underpins this essay holds true, state and lo-
cal governments throughout the country will have to confront the same policy
challenge. Legal theorists must begin to pay attention to informality.
IV. INFORMALITY AND LAW
Although economic need and global restructuring drive informality, it is a
direct product of the legal system. Its relationship to legality defines informal-
ity. Informality does not naturally inhere in productive activities.' 0 2 This distin-
guishes informality from criminality: Criminality involves illegal means to
achieve illegal ends, such as drug trafficking; informality involves illegal
means to achieve legal ends, such as building a house or running a small busi-
ness.
But explanations for law's role in creating informality differ greatly.
Economists, led by Hernando De Soto and those in the United States influ-
enced by his work, °3 explain informality as a product of irrational or oppres-
sive governmental regulation that makes entry into the formal market too bur-
densome or costly.'0 4 Their solution is deregulation. Sociologists Manuel
Castells, Alejandro Portes, and Saskia Sassen, by contrast, see informality as a
form of exploitation of labor through the withdrawal of law from an arena of
economic activity. The state may either not regulate or not enforce regulations
102. Castells & Portes, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY, supra note 24, at 26. See also id at 15:
Criminal activities possess... distinct characteristics that set them apart from those otherwise
termed informal.... Those labeled "Criminal" specialize in the production of goods and
services socially defined as illicit. On the other hand, the basic distinction between formal and
informal activities proper does not hinge on the character of the final product, but on the
manner in which it is produced and exchanged.
103. See De Soto, supra note 92. On De Soto's adoption by U.S. economists, see Jane Kaufman
Winn, How To Make Poor Countries Rich and How to Enrich Our Poor, 77 IOWA L. REv. 899 (1992)
(reviewing HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1989)).
104. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Ambiguous Moral Foundations of the Underground Econ-
omy, 103 YALE L.J. 2259, 2271 (1994). Assessing the meaning of De Soto's research on informal sec-
tors of the Peruvian economy, Priest writes: "The Peruvian informal economy... arose to satisfy unful-
filled demands. Constrained by governmental regulations that made acquiring urban land and housing
virtually impossible through formal, legal means, the Peruvian informals created settlements through
squatting and private investment." Id.
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on the books. But by permitting exploitation, the state implicitly encourages in-
formality and politically benefits from the resulting lower consumer costs and
privatized solution to basic social provision.10 5 Their solution is stepped-up
regulation and enforcement. By either of these explanations, informality is an
indigenous response to the unproductive use of law, 1°6 but the conflicting diag-
noses of too much or too little law are not easily reconciled.
Despite law's role in defining the informal sphere, few legal scholars in the
United States study informality. 10 7 One explanation is the familiar problem of
"othering." The United States distances itself from development problems and
solutions such as informal housing, as do its scholars. U.S. academics have
somewhat revived law and development studies focused on bringing western
law to democraticizing countries around the world. °8 This new attention to
law's role in development is hardly a dialogue, however, but instead a one-way
transfer: The new scholarship expresses little sense that the United States has
much to learn from policies like regularization pioneered in the developing
world. 109
Further, informality by its nature tends to be covert, lessening the visibility
and hence the priority of the issue. Informality only becomes visible when the
number of informals grows or informals organize and make political claims for
recognition. No one can say with certainty how many people work, buy, and
find shelter within the informal economy in this country. Informals are further
hidden from the mainstream because they are disproportionately non-white,
immigrant, non-English speakers, and female. Taken together, these interre-
lated marginalities obscure the general theoretical significance of informality
and allow scholars and policymakers to dismiss informality as ad hoc or ran-
dom law evasion.
This may be too forgiving an assessment, however. If the fact of informality
105. See Castells & Portes, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY, supra note 24, at 27:
Informalization is not a social process always developing outside the purview of the state; it is
instead the expression of a new form of control characterized by the disenfranchisement of a
large sector of the working class, often with the acquiescence of the state. For the latter, the
loss of formal control over these activities is compensated by the short-term potential for le-
gitimation and renewed economic growth that they offer.
106. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx
to Markets, Il1 HARV. L. REv. 621, 645 (1998).
107. Exceptions are cited in the footnotes of this Article.
108. This renewed scholarly engagement is encouraged and funded by engines of globalization
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
109. The observation is made by many, including Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law in Development: On
Tapping, Gourding and Serving Palm- Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 167, 213 (1997):
The new teaching, like the old, is justified and legitimated in tenors of the capacity to mold
and adapt the internal policies of these emergent or transitional societies so that they conform
to the prescriptions of the external factors. Conclusions as to the success or failure of law in
the development processes of these societies are packaged and presented in tenors of the in-
terests associated with the United States and the West.
In Santos's terms, this is an instance of a "globalized localism." See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying
text.
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seems "foreign," the phenomenon nonetheless poses familiar theoretical ques-
tions for law. Like zoning, rent control, the implied warranty of habitability,
and housing discrimination, informal housing exemplifies the ways in which
law shapes the social production of urban space. Likewise, informal housing
represents an instance of social conflict around the law of property and land use
analogous to familiar issues of exclusionary zoning, gentrification, and envi-
ronmental justice.
Yet legal scholars' neglect of informality implicates more than unfamiliar-
ity and invisibility. Put simply, informals have no natural political allies in the
law. Informals strive for legitimacy, meaning laws and policies that tolerate and
even facilitate their activity. But informality contradicts foundational principles
of legality and equality, and thus confounds legal scholars. On the one hand,
informality is an abuse of law. Wherever informality gains legitimacy, it does
so by using politics and social relations to get around rules to which others
must conform. On the other hand, informality is exploitation and inequality. To
legitimize informality is to accept substandard conditions for some that violate
generally applicable norms of dignity, health, safety, or fairness. Unequal en-
forcement of law and double standards are hallmarks of illegitimacy in our le-
gal system. Thus, the greatest barriers to engaging legal scholars with the issues
of informality seem not so much political as meta-political: "You can't think
there from here."
A. Turning Illegality into Legality
Consider the first claim that informality abuses lawfulness by tolerating
those who use private negotiation or collective political clout to get around the
law. From this perspective we could criticize regularization policies as confer-
ring unfair benefits. The "price" of housing in the United States includes the
cost of privately financing public infrastructure and services, with developers
fronting the capital and passing the costs through to purchasers. Consumers pay
for other public goods through increased prices, notably those resulting from
zoning and planning, albeit less directly. 10 But if some buyers purchase land
and build houses without paying any of these costs, and later use politics to
gain access to them at taxpayer expense, have they "gamed" the system?
Public choice theorists might deem this rent-seeking.III If informals be-
110. For example, aesthetic restrictions designed to protect the "character" of a neighborhood such
as prohibition of multi-family units or of manufactured or mobile homes, minimum lot size restrictions,
and density, setback and frontage regulations, are among the most costly regulatory regimes in terms of
housing affordability. See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A
PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS (1985).
111. Rent-seeking occurs when interest groups use their political capital to secure goods from the
state. Rent-seeking derives from public choice theory, which understands political outcomes as de-
pending on groups' political capital rather than their political ideals. Organized interest groups expend
their resources competing for political favors, such as tax breaks or subsidies, instead of putting them to
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come highly organized, their political strategy may prevail over the large and
unorganized group of people who acquire housing through conventional pro-
duction and financing. 112 In fact, some evidence of the effectiveness of political
organization among colonia residents in the legislative battles over colonia
policy in Texas exists. 113
Thus, what from one viewpoint might be an indication of democratic
vigor-the organization of the poor and excluded into a political movement of
informals-would, from this point of view, be a distortion of democracy. En-
gaging in "self-help" that creates a social problem whose solution requires ex
post public intervention and public monies could be deemed strategic behavior.
Where the political system rewards strategic behavior, the general populace
may become cynical about lawfulness, and the law may thereby lose its legiti-
macy as a principled and even-handed authority. Politicized enforcement in-
vites not just cynicism, but also corruption and a decline in voluntary compli-
ance.
The conflict with legality need not be fatal, however. From doctrines like
adverse possession, the law has some experience with turning illegality into le-
gality without damaging its fundamental commitment to lawfulness. At the
least, informality seems to be a problem with which our legal tradition is fa-
miliar.
B. Legitimating Inequality
Perhaps the tolerance of exploitation and inequality intrinsic to informality
presents the more grave problem for legal scholars. Do regularization policies,
premised on legitimating informal housing, give the law's imprimatur to that
inequality? Will inequality, in turn, tend to increase?
Richard Delgado contends that policies predicated on tolerance of infor-
mality in housing production may be "pragmatic[]" but can never be justified
"as a matter of social principle.... [Such] theory is explicitly predicated on a
some productive use. In economic theory, rent-seeking is Kaldor-Hicks inefficient because it leads to an
overall decline in social wealth. See generally Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking, in THE NEW PALGRAVE:
THE WORLD OF ECONOMICS 604, 604-09 (John Eatwell et al., eds. 1991).
112. Small cohesive groups have an advantage organizing for political activity over large, diffuse
groups because they more easily overcome collective action problems. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971). Thus small cohesive
groups control political capital disproportionate to the interests they represent in a democratic and ma-
joritarian society.
113. Texas colonia residents have created strong grassroots organizations, like Colonias Unidas in
Starr County, as well as established supportive alliances with various NGOs, the United Farmworkers,
and the churches. These groups have been key players in bringing local, state and federal political at-
tention to colonia needs. See generally Roberto E. Villareal, The Politics of Entrepreneurship: Mexican
American Leadership in a Border Setting, 2 J. BORDERLANDS STUD. 75 (1989). The point is relative,
however. These groups have greater voice than do poor people generally; they do not, however, always
prevail against other powerful and organized interests.
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legal acceptance of otherness, difference, and perhaps inferiority. '114 Directing
his comments specifically to earlier work in which I urged caution in adopting
the conventional regulatory approaches to housing quality in the colonias,'
1 5
Delgado compares this position to Plessy v. Ferguson.
116
That earlier work argued against standard building codes and instead for
minimal standards specifically designed to allow the self-building and incre-
mental housing consolidation essential to the economic logic of informal
housing:
Unrealistically high standards will exclude low-income families.... But if stan-
dards are too low, not only will health and safety be threatened, but any housing
constructed quickly will deteriorate and be abandoned, once again constricting the
supply of affordable housing.... To build decent, affordable, and long-lasting
housing.... land use regulation must be stripped to its core.
117
That article also proposed requiring only progressive compliance, and tying
compliance to the credit and technical assistance necessary to make even these
minimal standards attainable for colonia residents:
Imposing a building code on already-existing colonia housing should be progres-
sive, mandating gradually higher construction standards over time. The progressive
building code must be paired with access to credit for home improvement and tech-
nical assistance, as well as program incentives to mobilize owners' sweat equity....
Over a period of years, informal and substandard subdivisions gradually can be up-
graded and regularized to meet basic but conventional standards of safety, security,
quality, and amenity without dislocating the residents in place. 118
Countering these proposals, Delgado calls for "equal enforcement of all
housing, zoning, and sanitation codes"" 9 in the colonias: "[W]e need govern-
mental enforcement, formally administered, under universal standards applica-
ble to all."' 20 This means, he emphasizes, "No tradeoffs or exceptions, in other
words.... of the kind Larson is willing to tolerate as a matter of pragmatic re-
alism."' 2' "Formality," he insists, "tends to assure a better result, all other
114. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Twelfth Chronicle: The Problem of the Shanty, 85 GEO. L.J.
667, 688 (1997) [hereinafter The Problem of the Shanty]. The essay has been reprinted in RICHARD
DELGADO, WHEN EQUALITY ENDS: STORIES ABOUT RACE AND RESISTANCE (1999). As in other of his
Chronicles, Delgado structures The Problem of the Shanty as a discussion between Professor and com-
panion-interlocutors, in this instance, Rodrigo and Giannina. For simplicity's sake I attribute statements
made by Professor, and also by Rodrigo and Giannina, to Delgado, unless he explicitly disclaims the
position in the text. In this I do not treat the Chronicles as literature, a genre in which fictional charac-
ters are treated as virtually "real," but instead assume that Delgado has written essay-commentaries that
use narrative form, dialogue, and multiple voices as a technique for the exposition of the author's own
ideas and analysis.
115. See Larson, supra note 32, at 247-50.
116. The Problem of the Shanty, supra note 114, at 688 (citing 163 U.S. 537 (1896))..
117. Larson, supra note 32, at 249.
118. Id. at 249-50.
119. The Problem of the Shanty, supra note 114, at 689.
120. Id. at 680.
121. Id.
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things being equal. 122
This invocation of Plessy serves as a reminder that a flexible or gradual
regulatory standard can also be taken as a double standard, 123 and that double
standard interpreted as a symbol of unequal civil status, indeed of a lesser hu-
manity. Delgado argues that such standards for colonia housing treat residents
differently in ways that perpetuate their exclusion and inferiority in both practi-
cal and symbolic ways. Not only will substandard housing conditions persist in
colonias because of such policies, he argues, but such conditions will come to
be considered "acceptable because they are normal for them-for the people
who live there."
' 124
This creates a slave-like class that can be hired for less: a positive advantage for the
factories. Eventually, no white firm-not even a nonracist one-will hire a Mexican
at full salary, even if he or she has a Ph.D. No school board will consider a pupil-
assignment scheme that mixes Mexican and white kids. The idea simply won't
come to mind .... The very existence of the colonias enhances racial and social seg-
regation of the rapidly growing Mexican population. 
125
This critique of differential treatment focuses on law's expressive function,
specifically the messages of racial inferiority that the state's legitimation of
substandard housing will convey.
This debate over building codes in the colonias recapitulates long-standing
struggles within legal theory over the issue of equal versus different treatment,
or adherence to norms of formal versus substantive equality.12 To frame that
larger discussion simply: People who are different can be disadvantaged by
treating them the same as others in contexts where they cannot live up to the
accepted norm; but they can also be disadvantaged if they are treated as differ-
ent in a way that reinforces traditional stereotypes or perpetuates their position
of exclusion or inferiority. 127 In our exchange over building codes in the colo-
122. Id. at 681.
123. Nor is the threat imposed by this problem of the double standard easily contained. Not just
building codes, but most zoning and planning restrictions and many environmental regulations, as well
as some subdivision regulations and landlord-tenant reforms have demonstrable exclusionary effects.
124. The Problem of the Shanty, supra note 114, at 675.
125. Id. (internal citations omitted). Delgado is referring to norm theory in this symbolic claim. On
norm theory, see generally Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Em-
pathy, 84 CAL. L. REV. 61 (1996).
126. The debate has been important to both feminist and critical race theory. Within critical race
theory the issue is race consciousness, whether in legal doctrine and social policy (such as the debates
over color-blindness versus affirmative action), see e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution
is Colorblind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991), or in scholarship, Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of
Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989) and Colloquy, Responses to Randall Kennedy's Ra-
cial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1844 (1990). Within feminism the debate is cast
as one over equal versus different or special treatment. E.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality
Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity in the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1142-44
(1986). See generally Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv.
L. REV. 10, 31 (1987) (drawing a parallel between the feminist equal treatment/special treatment debate
and the color-blindness/affirmative action debate in the racial equality context).
127. Joan Chalmers Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path
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nias, Delgado advocates equal treatment and formal equality; I argue for special
treatment and substantive equality.
Joan Williams points out that what is cast as an argument over equal versus
special treatment is often really a disagreement over strategy rather than fun-
damental principle. This clarification is helpful. Both Delgado and I agree that
everyone should be assured of decent housing notwithstanding ability to pay.
We even agree more on the specific issue of housing quality standards than the
rhetoric of our exchange suggests.
Delgado seems to concede that standard building codes are not appropriate
for the colonias. He clarifies that in calling for uniform standards applicable to
all, he does not mean "exactly the same" standards are appropriate for all com-
munities: "But not as discrepant as now."' 128 Rather, his goal is basic or mini-
mal standards, particularly for water and sewer services. "There should be
written standards for such things, applied uniformly across the board. Beverly
Hills will choose to be far above those basic standards. But we should make
sure every community has water that meets the minimum level of cleanliness
and sufficiency. Sewers, too. 1
29
Although he specifically disclaims any "tradeoffs or exceptions,' 130 Del-
gado does not want to displace existing residents by implementing any new
housing standards or zoning laws. He would grandfather existing housing and
businesses, making only newcomers "toe the line."
"What about housing and zoning ordinances?" Giannina asked.
"You said you wanted formal fairness. Would you condemn two-thirds of the
houses because they are made of pieces of tin and plywood and don't meet the
housing code? And what about land-use zoning? If you prohibited people from op-
erating businesses out of their homes, you would have to close down all the auto
repair shops, laundries, and clothing piecework that go on now in the homes and
neighborhoods. Half the income of the colonias would dry up. You'd start out do-
ing the people a favor but end up harming them."
"I'd grandfather in existing businesses," Rodrigo answered, "so that no one
would be thrown out of work. As for newcomers, I'd make them toe the line




It is unclear if Delgado's "grandfathering" solution is intended to apply to
houses constructed in violation of building codes as well as to businesses lo-
cated in violation of zoning ordinances. I am assuming that it does. But even if
existing residents are exempted from new regulatory standards, enforcing only
against "newcomers" does not answer the housing affordability crisis for the
Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 298.
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local population. Only by permitting colonias to grow, i.e., giving newcomers
the same opportunity existing residents have taken, can colonias ease the
housing crisis for the working poor of the region. Thus, Delgado and I may be
close to agreement on the issue of minimal standards, but we disagree on the
broader policy question whether to encourage or resist informal housing. Is in-
formal housing a solution to, or only a symptom of, widening inequality?
The core of the disagreement may not be equal versus special treatment, but
rather political strategy, specifically, how to proceed if a fundamental change of
the existing order is not on the horizon. As Joan Williams puts the question,
"what to do when they are forced to settle (as they often must) for half a
loaf."'132 Our divergent answers depend crucially, I believe, on differing as-
sessments of the political culture within which we operate.
Delgado opts for vigilant adherence to the principles and political victories
that existing laws represent. "We can enlarge the pie for the poor people of the
colonias by standing with them in a program of resistance and activism .... At
some point, government will come around."' 133 I opt for flexible alternatives to
accommodate and build on, rather than resist, informality. The current climate
of growing and entrenched economic inequality and diminished political will
for government programs may be a fundamental change of the terms of the so-
cial contract. I cannot support holding poor families hostage to their need for
shelter while we struggle to force government to keep promises it no longer
intends to honor.
C. Converging Critiques of Unattainable Standards
Similar debates over legal strategy and differing visions of the politically
possible occurred in the mid-1980s as progressive lawyers and activists sought
answers to the intensifying housing crisis, symbolized then by the rise of urban
homelessness. The major federal subsidy for low-income housing was, and re-
mains today, the Section 8 Existing Housing program. 34 Section 8 gives re-
cipients vouchers that allow them to rent private housing at prevailing market
rates. The recipient pays 30% of income toward housing and the government
subsidizes the balance of the rent.
Created in 1974, Congress never fully funded the Section 8 program, and
thereby never accepted the responsibility of assuring adequate housing for
every person without regard for ability to pay. Resistance to full funding rests
on political reluctance to intervene in the private housing market, as well as
pragmatic concerns about the cost of such an entitlement. In turn, the costs of
fully funding the entitlement reflect the level of need, but also the cost of the
132. See Williams, supra note 127, at 311.
133. The Problem of the Shanty, supra note 114, at 687-88.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1437F (2001).
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strict quality standards required for rental units to be eligible for the subsidy.
Without full funding, Section 8 houses some low-income people in quality af-
fordable shelter, but leaves most poor people with no housing assistance at all.
The government rations assistance by means of waiting lists often tens and
even hundreds of thousands of names long.'
35
Various alternative policies could address this shortfall, including expand-
ing the supply of cheap housing by reducing housing quality standards. 136 HUD
revised Section 8 housing quality standards in the 1980s with respect to single-
room occupancy (SRO) housing,' 37 but left unchanged standards applied to
rental housing for families.
Lucie White has struggled with the related questions of how high quality
standards affect accessibility and affordability of legal services for the poor,
138
and of child care for poor working families.' 39 Each setting presents the same
quandary: Are proposals to step back from equal enforcement of demanding
regulatory standards a symptom of, rather than a solution to, widening inequal-
ity?
White asks whether the legal services that society provides for low-income
people should be the same as, or different from, the legal services purchased by
high-income clients. Is endorsing the principle of equal legal services the best
means of promoting social equality? "What do we think," she asks, "of a social
welfare regime that promotes equality and anti-subordination by promising, but
never delivering, an elite quality and level of social (and legal) service to poor
people through state bureaucratic arrangements?"'
140
White recognizes that moving away from an equal standard represents a
loss. "[L]etting go of the goal of a uniform level of service for all persons car-
135. See, e.g., Lucie E. White, Representing "The Real Deal," 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 271,
(1990/91).
136. If you can't expand the supply of affordable housing, the obvious other alternative is to in-
crease income through wages, welfare, or taxes. In the 1990s there were small increases in income from
greater employment, a rising minimum wage, and increases in earned income tax credit. The cost of
housing, however, outstripped these small income gains. In the most recent period, for example, rents
increased at twice the general rate of inflation (and thus of wages). Further, income became more inse-
cure with the welfare reforms of the 1990s. See U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
THE WIDENING GAP: NEW FINDINGS ON HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN AMERICA 2-3 (June 2000).
137. SROs are an essential housing resource for urban single adults. Most observers attribute a
meaningful part of the rise of urban homelessness in the 1980s to reductions in the supply of SRO
housing and the failure to replace it. One partial response was to rewrite the housing standards to pre-
serve and promote the growth of SRO housing. E.g., Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act,
42 U.S.C. § 11401 (1988) (amended 1996) (mandating rental assistance for SRO dwellings under the
Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation program, 42 U.S.C. § 1437F (2001)).
138. Lucie White, Specially Tailored Legal Services For Low-income Persons in The Age of
Wealth Inequality: Pragmatism or Capitulation?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2573 (1999) [hereinafter
Pragmatism or Capitulation?].
139. Lucie White, Quality Child Care for Low-Income Families: Despair, Impasse, Improvisation,
in HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND WORK IN THE POST- WELFARE ERA 116 (Joel F. Handler & Lucie White
eds., 1999) [hereinafter Despair, Impasse, Improvisation].
140. Pragmatism or Capitulation?, supra note 138, at 2579.
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ries the message that we have given up on the struggle for equality, and have
resigned ourselves to living out our lives on an increasingly wealth-divided
globe." 14 1 But she also sees potential gains through the political work of inno-
vating alternative strategies for assuring decent quality and affordability
through collaborative work with the communities to be served.
Letting go of the normative goal of a uniform level of service delivery for all per-
sons will force us to acknowledge the depth of the current trend toward great wealth
inequality. Letting go of that goal will force us to focus our practical know-how, re-
search, and policy on the challenges to survival and well-being that are faced by
those at the bottom. Letting go of that goal will force us to give up on the illusion
that we further, rather than undermine, social equality by providing an elite level of
services to a select few.
142
White examines the same questions in light of the growing demand for
child care services affordable to the low-income parents pressed into full-time
wage work by welfare reform. 143 The existing policy consensus is that a profes-
sionalized work force and higher licensing standards, combined with govern-
ment subsidies, will best meet child care needs. White suggests, instead, that
we let go of rigid notions of professionalism and regulation in favor of more
creative and flexible, but yet more uncertain, approaches for ensuring what she
calls "good enough" and "reliably decent" care that poor workers can afford.'
44
"Only such a shift in thinking," White contends, "will help us to avoid cata-
strophic outcomes for the less affluent and powerful among us.'
45
White acknowledges the dangers of such a strategy: "It will not be easy for
us to give up on bold social democratic visions about universal child care, or to
make hard judgements about when loosening up on licensing requirements or
professional standards, for instance, contributes to poor-quality care options for
poor children."'' 46 Yet, she concludes that a reluctance to experiment with alter-
natives to equal standards "will ensure a huge gap between officially endorsed
quality standard and day-to-day practices in our least powerful communities, a




143. See Despair, Impasse, Improvisation, supra note 139, at 116.
144. See id. at 118-19. Examples of some of the innovations White proposes include encouraging
peer networks of low-income, home-based child care providers; supporting well-designed parent educa-
tion and involvement programs in low-income neighborhoods and day care centers; partnerships be-
tween day care centers and providers in different socioeconomic, ethnic, or geographic areas within a
city or region; eclectic, well-supervised volunteer programs that supplement a day care center's core
teaching staff with a variety of differently skilled helpers; local bond issues or linkage programs for
raising capital for facility improvement loans, and the like. See id. at 119. "[T]hese new innovations
will produce more reliably decent child care for all families, regardless of income, because they draw
upon interpersonal connection and social commitment, as well as monetary compensation, professional
ideology, and regulatory oversight, to ensure good enough care." Id. at 120.
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In support of her claims, White observes that some progressive scholars of
health care delivery in the context of global wealth inequality also encourage
departure from equal and elite standards.148 These scholars challenge the idea
that a single normative vision of "equal health care" across the wealth spectrum
is appropriate for current conditions. Such a notion will fail in the short run be-
cause it will not guide practice, research, and policy to address the urgent
health needs of low income populations. And it will fail in the long-term be-
cause, rather than helping move society toward greater institutional equality, a
norm of health care service implicitly based on elite practices and institutions
will perpetuate "the bifurcated institutional practices that construct and main-
tain societal stratification."'1
49
Taken together, these critiques challenge the existing progressive consensus
on regulation across a broad range of social welfare settings, from housing to
legal services, child care, and health care. The premise of these converging cri-
tiques is that the current trend toward great wealth inequality and limited gov-
ernmental responsibility for basic social provision is enduring and fundamental.
Where the price for maintaining equal and elite standards is rationing of essen-
tial goods and services, these critics suggest we consider revising those stan-
dards to meet what White calls the "exploding universe of need.'
150
This critical skepticism of conventional regulatory strategies is pragmatic
but also normative, grounded in the recognition that existing standards were not
fashioned by or for poor communities, and may be inappropriate for their cir-
cumstances or contrary to their values. Rather than generalizing from elite in-
stitutions and practices in the interest of promoting an abstract idea of equality,
White, for example, argues:
[W]e may be better off endorsing the idea that the social needs of disfranchised
groups should be addressed sui generis, in ways that reflect their own experiences
of need, their embedded historical and cultural realities, the societal power land-
scapes from their perspectives, their capacities, and their normative aspirations.1
5 1
No one disagrees that much would be lost were we to abandon the aspira-
tional claims to social equality embodied in the commitment to universal stan-
dards. The ideal of law that equal standards evokes, by which the role of the
state is to manage society according to universal ideals, is counterposed against
the vision of these critical skeptics, in which standards are negotiated through
the medium of practice and social relations at the local level, and by which
law's role is "to support the public by adjusting policies to reinforce observed
148. See Pragmatism or Capitulation?, supra note 138, at 2578-79 (citing and discussing
WOMEN, POVERTY, AND AIDS: SEX, DRUGS AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE (Paul Fanner et al. eds.,
1996)).
149. Id. at 2579.
150. Id. at 2578.
151. Id.
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practice on the ground."' 52 Delgado recognizes this when he comments that my
argument for accommodating rather than resisting informality is "trying to ad-
just the people to their situation rather than the other way around.' 53
It is an article of faith, cultivated in U.S.-trained lawyers as part of their
history and identity, that law should lead the society rather than follow, that law
is an engine of social change. Equality and liberty have been the key arenas of
this vision of law as ahead of or against society. Racial desegregation, voting
rights, gender equality, and reproductive rights are the issues most often cited
as evidence that law can and should move society forward, in advance of ma-
jority or popular sentiment.1 54
This distinctly American vision of progressive lawmaking has as its central
mission "the alteration, the deviation, and the transformation" of social prac-
tice. 1 55 Law enforces an aspirational standard against the majority's will and
contradicts "observed practice on the ground." The hope is that those the state
coerces to accept the new standard in one generation will grow to accept and
even welcome the change in the next. Children educated in the integrated
schools of Brown v. Board of Education will grow up accepting a multi-racial
public world as normal, and perhaps even desirable.
This is an avowedly progressive, but also an elitist, model of law and its
relationship to social change. Thus, we find the countering perspective that law
should conform closely to observed practices of society explicitly voiced in
post-colonial societies.156 Where lawmaking leads society, the voices of the
elite empowered to speak through law (whether in litigation, legislation, or
policy debate) necessarily will be heard more clearly than those whose voices
are expressed in the constitution of everyday life. This is true no matter how
laudable or progressive the purposes behind the aspirational standard being ad-
vanced.
In between these competing views of law leading and law following, can
152. John Gillespie, Land Law Subsystems? Urban Vietnam as a Case Study, 7 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 555, 589 (1998).
153. The Problem of the Shanty, supra note 114, at 686.
154. But see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991) (questioning the role attributed to law as opposed to politics on the ground in bringing
about these particular social changes). The debate over law's role in social change is extensive, joined
with particular critical skepticism by Critical Legal Studies scholars.
155. Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 241, 263 (1993) (elaborating
the idea that a constitution primarily in the hands of Congress rather than the Court would be a more
progressive constitution). A related account of the "symbolic efficacy of law" in Latin America is found
in MAURICIO GARCiA VILLEGAS, LA EFICACIA SIMB6LICA DEL DERECHO (1993).
156. E.g., Thomas A. Gihring, From Elitism to Accountability: Towards a Re-formation of Nige-
rian Town-Planning Law, 10 QUARTERLY J. ADMEN. 411,419-421 (1976):
Development controls should not restrict development initiative, but rather should themselves
adapt to the natural process of urban growth.... Both British and Nigeria[n] experience has
demonstrated that the cumbersome process of reviewing applications often results in curtail-
ing development progress.... The existing legislation has achieved no higher purpose than
the reinforcement of elitism in the exercise of power.
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we retain the aspirational ambition of law without sacrificing the poor to elite
dreams? Can law mobilize social change without unfairly burdening those for
whom the aspirational standard is currently unattainable? In describing her vi-
sion of "aspirational" law, Robin West says "[i]t exists, very generally, to con-
struct a bridge.., between those present aspirations and our future, not between
our present predicaments and our past."
'1 57
If we look to our past, we find the exhausted (and exhausting) debate be-
tween strategies of equal or special treatment, with no evident resolution.
The future looks somber because economic privation intensifies the effects of
unattainable standards, even as government downscales its redistributive efforts
as well as its faith in social progress. Under these conditions of constraint, can
legal strategies maintain law's aspirational force without recreating its past pre-
dicaments of unattainable standards?
V. "TAKE WHAT THE COMMUNITY IS DOING AND MAGNIFY IT, EXTEND IT."' 15 9
Looking to the bottom-adopting the perspective of those who have seen and felt
the falsity of the liberal promise-can assist critical scholars in the task of fathom-
ing the phenomenology of law and defining the elements ofjustice.1
6 0
Scholars often overlook the strategic and theoretical resources of people
engaged in the struggle about which the scholar thinks and prescribes. This is
as true of equality theory as any other area of legal theory. Mari Matsuda urges
critical legal theorists to attend closely to the perspectives of people she calls by
the Gramscian term, "organic intellectuals."'1 61 Such people have lives shaped
by the oppression that critical legal theory seeks to address, have engaged in the
search for critical self-knowledge through close examination of their own cir-
cumstances, and have made a politics of the knowledge gained by working with
others in organized movements for change.162 "There is a standing concept in
movements for social change," she writes. "One needs to ask who has the real
interest and the most information."' 63 This is an argument for linking abstract
theory to concrete experience, and also a reason to restore empiricism as ordi-
157. West, supra note 155, at 262-63.
158. Joan Williams admits there is no easy answer to the thorny problem of divergent strategies
within movements for social justice and transformation. But she suggests that reframing the dispute in
terms of disagreements over strategy rather than basic commitments to equality will allow progressives
to avoid being diverted by fruitless internal arguments. See Williams, supra note 127, at 323.
159. Arizmendi Interview, supra note 75.
160. Marl J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 324 (1987) [hereinafter Looking to the Bottom].
161. Id.at325.
162. See Mar J.Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 1763, 1778-79 (1990) [hereinafter Pragmatism Modified]. "Subordinated status plus critical
consciousness-raising is the condition that produces the knowledge I seek.... It is a knowledge that is
increasingly available to us as we enter the age of the post-colonial university." Id. at 1780.
163. Looking to the Bottom, supra note 160, at 346.
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nary scholarly practice. 164 But more importantly, Matsuda argues that we must
treat such indigenous actors as theorists, studying the ways they have inter-
preted their experiences, and respecting the strategy and choices behind the
politics they have made of their condition.
Matsuda observes that this method often leads to concepts of law "radically
different from those generated at the top.,
165
Those who are oppressed in the present world can speak most eloquently of a better
one. Their language will not be abstract, detached or inaccessible; their program
will not be undefined. They will advance clear ideas about the next step to a better
world. The experience of struggling.., has taught much about struggle, about how
real people can rise up, look power in the eye and turn it around.
16 6
How do the colonia's own theorists analyze the political question of build-
ing codes and self-builders, and more broadly whether informal housing is a
solution to, or a symptom of, inequality? Many grassroots groups oppose adop-
tion of building codes in the counties. 167 When Texas was crafting sweeping
colonia legislation for introduction in the 1995 legislative session, for example,
Attorney General Dan Morales floated a provision that would have given the
border counties the power to adopt building codes. The provision was part of
Morales's determined efforts to publicize and eradicate substandard conditions
in the colonias. Self-help groups all along the border region organized as Ini-
ciativa Frontera, 68 and allied with statewide officials, experts, and non-
governmental organizations in the Border Coalition for Low-Income Housing,
to educate legislators and state policymakers on their opposition. 169 Colonia
residents recall riding buses from the border to Austin in order to confront state
officials on the issue.
In 2001, the Texas Legislature again came close to enacting legislation that
would have empowered counties to regulate building standards. The bill's ex-
plicitly described purpose was "to prevent the proliferation of colonias and sub-
164. See also Larson, supra note 32, at 235 ("Absent the prism of lived experience, pure theory or
politics (no matter how amenable the moral premises, or elegant the analytic structure) can generate
dangerously simplified prescriptions.").
165. Looking to the Bottom, supra note 160, at 346-47.
166. Id.
167. On the opposition of many community organizations in the colonias to expanding county
regulatory power, see Interview with Blanca Juirez, Colonia Ombuds for Starr County and a founder of
Colonias Unidas, in Rio Grande City, TX (Aug. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Ju~rez Interview]; Arizmendi
Interview, supra note 75. This position is supported by non-govemmental organizations active in com-
munities at the border, including the Texas Low-tncome Housing Information Service (TxLIHIS) and its
Border Coalition for Low-Income Housing. Interview with John Henneberger in Austin, TX (March 16,
2001).
168. Arizmendi Interview, supra note 75. Iniciativa Frontera included Sparks Housing (El Paso
County), Las Americas (Cameron County), Proyecto Azteca (Hidalgo County), Colonias Unidas (Starr
County), and La Gloria Development Corporation (Webb County). Id.
169. Judrez Interview, supra note 167; Interview with Amada (Aid6) Villareal, Starr County Colo-
nia Assistance Corporation, Rio Grande City, TX (Oct. 15, 1999).
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standard housing developments."' 170 In hearings, the bill sponsor, Sen. Eddie
Lucio, described the legislation as a tool "to prevent proliferation of colonias,
maintain reasonable standards, and provide decent quality of housing."'1 7 1 Sig-
nificantly, Sen. Lucio represents the border and has often been a progressive
advocate for colonia interests. Ironically, his bill was defeated at the last mo-
ment by unexpected opposition from conservative property rights groups op-
posed to land use regulation for any purpose. 172
Conventional building codes cannot be viewed as neutral standards either in
theory or practice. Building codes control new construction and remodeling of
existing structures. 173 Today's building codes are descended from those first
enacted in the early twentieth century when Progressive reformers of the tene-
ment house movement pushed for basic sanitation standards. Thus, codes origi-
nated as politically progressive and humanitarian reform measures. 174
But the modem codes in force in virtually every jurisdiction of this country
establish standards that far exceed what is required for health and safety, as ex-
plained by their genealogy. Model codes shape existing codes. Trade groups
play an active role in writing and revising model codes. When the federal gov-
ernment entered the housing finance arena through its insurance programs, in-
clusion of building standards in the federal underwriting process made these
model codes the template for regulation. 175 Most jurisdictions adopt one or
more of the handful of model codes, in whole or in part, often simply by refer-
176
ence.
These codes protect health and safety but also endorse middle class values
about housing configuration, appearance, and amenity. Some local jurisdictions
further heighten standards for explicitly exclusionary purposes. By requiring
170. S.B. 517, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us (last visited Oct.
16, 2001) (adding Chapter 236 to amend Local Government Code). S.B. 517 passed the State Senate on
March 6, 2001, and was referred to the House, where it passed out of committee but was stopped before
a full floor vote. Texas Legislature Online, Bill History for S.B. 517, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us (last
visited Oct. 16, 2001). The bill's purpose is described in § 236.001 of the legislation. S.B. 517, 77th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us (last visited Oct. 16, 2001). The bill would
have allowed counties to adopt rules that affect the size of lots; the height, number of stories, size and
numbers of buildings on a lot; the percentage of a lot that may be occupied; and the location of build-
ings or other structures on a lot. Id. The bill also would have allowed counties to adopt uniform build-
ing, plumbing, and electrical standards. Id.
171. Hearing, Subcommittee on Border Affairs, Senate Committee on Business & Commerce,
Texas Legislature, Feb. 20, 2001.
172. Telephone Interview with John Henneberger, Texas Low-Income Housing Information Serv-
ice (July 10, 2001).
173. Narrowly defined, "building" codes address the structure of buildings; supplemental codes
address such issues as plumbing and electrical systems. For simplicity I refer herein to the whole pack-
age of housing quality standards as "building codes."
174. Eric Damian Kelly, Fair Housing, Good Housing or Expensive Housing? Are Building
Codes Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 349, 350 (1996).
175. Id.at350-51.
176. Due to the complexity of building regulation, only the largest jurisdictions develop their own
building codes. Id. at 351.
Yale Law & Policy Review
high-skill labor, costly materials, and labor-intensive techniques, codes close
out self-builders and advance the economic interests of the construction and
building materials industries and of labor unions.177 Thus, the model code proc-
ess is a confluence of economic interests for whom affordability is not a core
policy goal.
David Arizmendi, a long-time community organizer and a nonprofit pro-
vider of self-help housing in the Hidalgo County colonias, believes "you cannot
impose housing quality standards on people without giving them the resources
to meet them."'' 78 No one knows what percentage of existing colonia houses
meet building codes, but a survey in Cameron Park, an older, relatively well-
consolidated colonia near Brownsville, Texas, found that four-fifths of the
housing did not meet code standards. Just 184 of 1,088 existing homes met
code standards. Of the others, 558 were substandard and 346 were dilapidated
and beyond repair.' 79 Cameron Park almost certainly has better quality housing
than other colonias because of its age and consequent degree of housing con-
solidation, and because of significant investment in infrastructure and housing
by government and nongovernmental organizations. The Cameron Park exam-
ple suggests that virtually all colonia houses would fail to comply with code
standards, many would be seriously deficient, and a significant portion would
have to be razed and rebuilt. Though one colonia provides admittedly slim evi-
dence, it suggests most colonia housing will fail to meet prevailing standards.
Even if existing structures were grandfathered, code standards would rule out
the typical construction practices for any new housing, including new or in-
complete construction on already-purchased lots.
In sum, prevailing building standards would make it illegal for families to
build affordable colonia housing. And if families tried to build, they would be
targeted disproportionately by such standards for enforcement and penalty.
Such codes would have the same practical effect as making informal housing
outright illegal.
Blanca Judrez, colonia resident and founder of Colonias Unidas, a self-help
group in Starr County, tries to educate policymakers in the debate over building
codes by moving from the abstract to the concrete: "It's a house or no house,"
she says. "Do you honestly believe these people will leave their houses just be-
cause they aren't safe or healthy?"' 80 In 1999, Judrez testified before the Texas
Legislature in support of a bill allowing residents to hook up to available utility
services even if they lived in an illegal or substandard colonia. She recalls the
testimony on that day as follows:
177. See id.
178. Arizmendi Interview, supra note 75.
179. See James Pinkerton, Water Project Up and Running, But Most Still Lack Running Water,
Hous. CHRON., Nov. 6, 1994, at Al (reporting on study by Cameron County).
180. Judirez Interview, supra note 167.
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They were saying "those people need to get out of those colonias, they are not liv-
able." Why would people leave their houses just because they don't have electricity
and water? Where would they 81ive, under a bridge? On balance, no water or elec-
tricity is better than no house.
Judtrez anticipates and is careful to dispel any beliefs that colonia residents are
ignorant or insensitive to tradeoffs their condition forces on them.
It isn't that they don't want to have a healthy life, and it isn't that they are used to
living without anything. Like they keep saying, "Oh, they're from Mexico, and
they're used to living without water or electricity." Well not allseople in Mexico
live with nothing, and not everyone in a colonia is from Mexico.
1
Those who live in existing colonias, and the many who would buy into such
settlements if development opened up again, face a "double bind" that is a
ubiquitous feature of oppression. Marilyn Frye describes the double bind as
"situations in which options are reduced to a very few and all of them expose
one to penalty. ' 83 Because there is no good choice (only better and worse
choices), the double bind does not easily lend itself to arguments of principle or
"either/or" solutions. Judrez captures the dilemma with characteristic immedi-
acy:
People here want good houses. I would like to live next to Bill Clinton, but the truth
is that I can't, I just can't. So I am going to build whatever I can. I am not living
under a bridge, and I am not asking the government to give me a house. I am just
doing the best that I can to make a house for my children and to live as good a life
as I can.
For Judrez and Arizmendi, solutions to colonias problems lie in helping
residents rather than penalizing them for their living conditions. In the absence
of political will to resolve the double bind, these local theorists believe that
building up from the "homemade solutions" of self-builders offers the best so-
lution. "The answer will have to come from the community," Arizmendi says.
"You have to take what the community is doing and magnify it, extend it."'
8 5
The community has responded to the lack of affordable housing by building
colonias. Thus, what might seem contradictory or paradoxical from a scholar's
perspective-to support self-help housing knowing it leads to substandard con-
ditions-is pragmatic, coherent, and strategic from the perspective of the colo-
nia's own theorists. As Matsuda reminds us, "[A]pparent logical inconsistency
in intellectual argument is not inconsistency in the real world. Intellectual ar-
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Marilyn Frye, Oppression, in POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 60, 60-
61 (Leslie Bender & Dann Braveman eds., 1995). On the double bind in law, see generally MARGARET
JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Femi-
nist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699 (1990).
184. Judrez Interview, supra note 167.
185. Arizmendi interview, supra note 75.
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guments may be paradoxical; real experiences cannot be."' 86
Consistent with the view that "[y]ou have to take what the community is
doing and magnify it, extend it," Arizmendi now heads a housing project
grounded in the principle of self-help and self-building. Proyecto Azteca 87 co-
ordinates self-help homebuilding in the colonias of Hidalgo County, near
McAllen, Texas. Collectives of householders build 900 square-foot, three-
bedroom ranch houses of conventional frame construction that are affordable to
families with very low incomes. Proyecto Azteca requires a family to commit a
member to work full-time for eight weeks with a collective work team that
builds a house for each family under the guidance of skilled builders. This
commitment of sweat equity, combined with substantial subsidies from the fed-
eral government and private foundations, allows Proyecto Azteca to charge
each family about $16,000 for the completed house, with a family's monthly
mortgage payments ranging from $90 to $150.188
Proyecto's houses meet minimum construction standards and are designed
for sturdiness and function. The houses also contain many design touches and
small amenities.' 89 "We want it to feel like your dream house," says Ariz-
mendi.' 90 This innovative model of housing provision has garnered national
awards and been replicated elsewhere. Yet the model depends upon subsidies
for land and building materials, and therefore on significant and continued
funding from government and private foundations. The unsubsidized cost of
constructing Proyecto's basic houses would be $55,000, even factoring in the
labor contributed by the self-builders.' 91 This price exceeds the means of the
colonia population.
Although production has doubled in the past two years, Proyecto has built
fewer than 300 houses in ten years. 92 The organization "rations" through a
waiting list many thousands of names long (just as public housing programs
do), and by policy decisions to concentrate house construction in particular
colonias as part of a broader community development agenda. 93 Proyecto Az-
teca is committed to facilitating self-help development rather than resisting it,
but the organization can barely begin to fill the need.
So what is happening to the population unable to afford housing built in ac-
cordance with the strict new standards imposed by Texas law? Local observers
note one perverse effect of the 1995 moratorium on new colonias is a decline in
186. Looking to the Bottom, supra note 160, at 341.
187. Located in San Juan, Texas, Proyecto Azteca is affiliated with the United Farmworkers.
188. Arizmendi Interview, supra note 75.
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housing quality. Developers have created few new subdivisions under the
tougher development rules because the required infrastructure has markedly in-
creased the price of a lot. With land prices higher, those who do buy into the
new, fully-serviced subdivisions have little left over to invest in housing con-
struction or consolidation. Those who cannot afford lots in the new subdivi-
sions either rent or live on internally subdivided lots in older colonias. Without
the incentive of ownership, the renters do not build permanent dwellings.
1 94
Those who buy the tiny lots carved out by internal subdivision suffer over-
crowding and may lack sufficient space to replace a trailer with a house, or to
construct a safe septic system. As a result of the 1995 law, the number of di-
lapidated trailers in both older and new colonias has increased. 195 Some fami-
lies are living on raw land in unplatted subdivisions without access to electric-
ity or water; because such developments are not platted, under current law, they
may never get access to these basic services.'
96
With this evidence before us, the debate over building codes in the colonias
can no longer be an abstract question of equality theory. Attention to the voices
and choices of community leaders offers no single answer, as activists speak in
the language of "both/and" rather than "either/or." "People here want good
houses... but the truth is that [they] can't [buy a good house].... So I am go-
ing to build whatever I can."' 97 "[Y]ou cannot impose housing quality stan-
dards on people without giving them the resources to meet them."'1 98 The
translation of these insights into legal policy must respect and not attempt to
erase the tension between those multivocal positions. Matsuda argues that theo-
rists can make claims for justice, but they can be proved right or wrong only
through pragmatic method, "through intuition, guided by reason, tested against
the lives of real people."' 199 Matsuda reminds us, "At the end of our theoretical
struggle is someone's life."200
VI. REGULATING UNDER CONDITIONS OF EXTREME ECONOMIC CONSTRAINT
Deregulation, as well as regulation as we know it, is a simplified prescrip-
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Texas Local Government Code section 232.023 mandates that subdivisions in the border re-
gion certify in the platting process their conformity to the Minimum State Standards and Model Politi-
cal Subdivision Rules adopted pursuant to Texas Water Code section 16.343. Without such proof of
conformity, no resident of an unplatted, an illegally platted, or a nonconforming subdivision can get
access to public utilities. See TEx. LOc. GOV'T CODE § 232.029. Under a 1999 statute, Texas Local
Government Code section 232.029(c), some occupants of homes built in pre-1996 subdivisions that
cannot meet the tougher standards, but whose utility service already has been extended, may get access
to utilities in limited conditions.
197. Juirez Interview, supra note 167.
198. Arizmendi Interview, supra note 75.
199. Looking to the Bottom, supra note 160, at 360.
200. Pragmatism Modified, supra note 162, at 1770.
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tion that will not increase affordability or quality of housing for the poor. Nei-
ther conventional strategy will extend law's reach so as to integrate informal
economic activity. Eliminating government regulation removes a powerful tool
for collective action in the struggle for economic justice. Government enforce-
ment of unattainable standards burdens those already on the margins and in-
creases reliance on informal solutions. How can law facilitate more adequate
housing for populations under conditions of extreme economic constraint with-
out mandating unattainable standards?
Legislatures could enact laws for purely symbolic purposes, with no intent
to require compliance. This is not an accepted use of law within the United
States (although it occurs in practice). Within our legal tradition, where law
does not demand compliance, the rule of law symbolically and publicly falters.
From the perspective of a rule of law regime characteristic of a liberal democ-
racy, law's effectiveness depends on its enforcement. Laws exist to regulate
conduct and not for symbolic uses. 201 By longstanding norms of judicial power,
a court that is unable to prescribe an adequate remedy will refuse to hear a
202
case.
Likewise, U.S. law contains few mechanisms for delayed or gradual en-
forcement based on the recognition of the immediate unattainability of the legal
standard. When the U.S. Supreme Court declared racial segregation of the
public schools to be illegal in Brown v. Board of Education, and then imposed
remedies requiring only "all deliberate speed" in compliance, the Court under-
mined its own ruling.
203
Where compliance places an economic burden on a regulated party who
lacks the resources to comply, is there any alternative to enforcement consistent
201. Cf Dolores Donovan, Codification in Developing Nations: Ritual and Symbol in Cambodia
and Indonesia, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 693,732-733 (1998) (writing about the symbolic uses of law):
From the perspectives of ritual and symbol, enforcement of the written law in Cambodia and
Indonesia is not a necessary condition to its effectiveness in serving the purposes for which it
was enacted .... A government that enacts laws for their symbolic value is likewise absolved
of any immediate duty of implementation or enforcement. The symbolic view of codification,
like the ritual one, can serve as a cover for a multitude of sins. Not the least of the advantages
of the symbolic view of law is that it allows a government to pick and choose the laws that it
will enforce. The choices may be made in the interests of fairness, as in the case of a decision
to delay enforcement of a newly-enacted law criminalizing polygamy, or the choices may be
made in the interests of suppressing political dissent, as in the case of a decision immediately
to enforce a newly-enacted law criminalizing allegedly irresponsible criticism of a govem-
ment. Selective enforcement of the sort common in developing nations does not necessarily
mean that the unenforced laws were enacted cynically or without any true intention of estab-
lishing the rule of law.
202. See generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS
392-97, 395, 415-16 (2d ed. 1994); DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 86-
89 (2d ed. 1996).
203. The Supreme Court first held the plaintiffs entitled to relief in Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Following reargument on the appropriate form of relief, the Court decided Brown
v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown 11). On the ensuing rule of law crisis, compare
Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection: Judicial Remedies, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1133
(1969), with ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 254-68 (2d ed. 1986).
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with the rule of law? Where the remedy is equitable (as an injunction), a court
may delay relief under some circumstances. Typically, the delay is short and its
204availability is dependent on the equities of the case at hand. Such an equita-
ble remedy could not be fashioned for general application in the case of the
colonias. Yet, the acceptance of equitable flexibility indicates our legal tradi-
tion's recognition of the problem of unattainable standards, particularly when
the law imposes positive economic obligations.
Sociological observers of small claims court note that judges sometimes
manipulate continuances in order to enable parties to work things out, and
sometimes to allow defendants to come up with funds to pay off landlords or
creditors, thereby avoiding the harsh and final remedy of eviction or reposses-
sion.20 5 In the executive branch, prosecutorial discretion allows law enforcers to
decline to require compliance. Similarly, by the "law on the ground" in force in
large U.S. cities, regulators systematically ignore housing code violations and
occupancy limit violations that might take scarce low-income housing out of
service. But all these discretionary mechanisms preserve the illegality of the
underlying conduct and, thus, the vulnerability of the violator. So, too, neither
formal nor informal exercises of enforcement discretion use law to bring about
aspirational changes in housing quality.
Commentators have argued for the creation of gradual or flexible forms of
regulation that can bring informal economic activities "within the regulatory
framework while minimizing costs to entrepreneurs."
20 6
Policies... could be designed so as to induce an "upgrading" of informal activities
by bringing these activities within the regulatory framework while minimizing costs
to entrepreneurs. Upgrading is likely to demand greater flexibility in the imple-
mentation of existing codes and acknowledgment by city officials that compliance
may require several phases. Lower thresholds of regulatory compliance would be
applied to new, small-scale businesses in low-income communities than to well-
established businesses that have had an opportunity to recover start-up costs.
207
But the legal form for this flexibility remains unspecified.
To find a model for enforcing the "progressive realization" of a currently
unattainable legal standard, we must look to international human rights law.
208
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("Eco-
204. In nuisance cases, for example, the decree may allow the defendant time to work out some
change in his or her activities that would minimize the nuisance, rather than require cessation of opera-
tions at once, provided the public interest is not threatened. E.g., Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367,
418-19 (1929). See generally W. Page Keeton & Clarence Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities,"
18 TEX. L. REv. 412 (1940).
205. See JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ET1HNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE, 82-112 (1990). The authors observe that in informal courts,
judges vary greatly in both styles and approaches to the law.
206. GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, supra note 83, at 166.
207. Id.
208. I am indebted to Heinz Klug and Berta Hemdndez-Truyol for help in formulating this pro-
posal.
Yale Law & Policy Review
nomic Covenant") 20 9 recognizes the human right of all people to "an adequate
standard of living.., including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the
continuous improvement of living conditions.",2  By ratifying the Economic
Covenant, parties undertake an obligation to assure their people this basic sus-
tenance.
One hundred twenty-seven nations have signed the Economic Covenant,
211including many nations in which most of the people lack adequate housing.
Does this mean that the positive rights guaranteed by the Economic Covenant
are not really part of international law at all, but merely symbolic expressions
of aspiration?
Indeed, the Economic Covenant does not guarantee immediate provision of
adequate housing to all persons. As a practical matter, economic rights cannot
be implemented in all the same ways as civil and political rights, and the Eco-
212nomic Covenant recognizes this. The Economic Covenant requires these
rights to be "progressively... realiz[ed] ... to the maximum of... available
[governmental] resources." Thus, the Economic Covenant takes resource con-
straints into account; the rich nation must provide more than the poor one.213 In
many instances, citizens will only gradually realize the right relative to the na-
tion's economic resources.
Furthermore, the Economic Covenant does not impose universal standards
for measuring compliance. States parties to the agreement may have differing
standards for judging the adequacy of shelter, and the right may be guaranteed
in a wide variety of political settings with no particular steps mandated for its
full realization.
By this model, there are no immediately enforceable rights to full compli-
ance from all regulated parties. Some commentators have argued that these
measures of enforceability are the markers of a legal right, and they therefore
regard the commitment to progressive realization of the Economic Covenant
rights as something less than law. 214 Since 1981, the United States has main-
209. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, 5.
210. Id. atart. 11(1).
211. These are the signatories as of Dec. 31, 1993. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 410 (1995).
212. States have direct power to establish structures that protect their citizens' civil and political
liberties, such as police, courts and constitutions, but they cannot create the natural or social resources
to feed and house those citizens by the same measures. Yet states do have the power to influence the
creation of wealth, and even more directly, to distribute and redistribute wealth by structures such as
propeity law, social welfare, and taxation. So the unenforceability of economic rights can be overstated.
213. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 361 (Henry J. Steiner et al. eds., 4th ed. 1994).
214. On the debate, see JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
164-202 (1989); Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations
Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTs. Q. 156, 165-
66 (1987); Louis Henkin, International Human Rights and Rights in the United States, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25, 33 (Theodore Meron ed., 1984); Louis B. Sohn, The New Interna-
tional Law: Protection of the Right of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 19-20
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tained that economic, social and cultural rights "belong in a qualitatively differ-
ent category from other rights, that they should not be seen as rights but as
goals of economic and social policy.
215
In general, negative rights provide the norm of legal rules in our tradition
rather than positive rights. Negative rights prohibit the state from doing some-
thing, such as denying benefits without due process, or restricting freedom of
religion. Positive rights generally refer to rights imposing an affirmative obli-
gation on the state. The approaches governments use to assure these two kinds
of rights generally differ, with programs of distribution and redistribution used
for positive rights and programs of enforcement employed for negative rights.
Yet, if the law focuses on enforceability generally, as opposed to immediate
and full compliance, the principle of progressive realization and the require-
ment of commitment of maximum available resources do bind parties equally
and in legally enforceable ways. The principle of progressivity requires that
states parties create programs and policies to address the housing need, and
make steady progress over time to increase access to adequate housing. These
standards obligate equally. The requirement of progress consistent with avail-
able resources imposes an "immediate and readily identifiable obligation upon
states parties," permits measurement, and hence allows for meaningful en-
forcement.2 16
The United Nations monitors compliance with the Economic Covenant.
The Economic Covenant obliges parties in annual seasons to submit reports to
the Secretary General regarding the progress of implementation. Individuals
cannot petition for violations21 7 (although this right exists for civil and political
rights), and the United Nations lacks the authority for independent investigation
or sanction against non-complying countries.
Because of this dearth of enforcement powers, as much as the positive
rights critique, skeptics have concluded that the Economic Covenant is weak.
Nonetheless, if the progressive realization model were adapted for domestic
regulatory purposes, effective enforcement mechanisms could be adopted.
"Progressive realization" provides a regulatory conception for imposing as-
pirational standards while calibrating compliance obligations to available eco-
nomic resources. Adapting this legal technology for a domestic regulatory re-
gime, government may evenhandedly include the poorest colonia and Beverly
(1982).
215. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 36th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/40/C.3/SR.36 (1985), quoted in Alston
& Quinn, supra note 214, at 158. See also Cass Sunstein, Against Positive Rights: Why Social and
Economic Rights Don't Belong in the New Constitutions of Post-Communist Europe, E. EUR. CONST.
REV., Winter 1993, at 35-36 (arguing against the inclusion of positive rights in constitutions).
216. Alston & Quinn, supra note 214, at 165-66.
217. An optional protocol, entered into force in 1976, permits petitions from individuals and non-
governmental organizations. Few states have chosen to adopt it. Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 383.
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Hills under a universal housing standard, obliging compliance from residents
in each setting according to their realistic capacity to meet the standard.
The progressive realization model understands equality and legality differ-
ently than the conventional approaches described above. 219 The model respects
formal equality by establishing a single legal standard of adequate housing, and
measuring compliance from each person by the single standard of commitment
of maximum available resources. The model respects legality because compli-
ance is always possible under the "maximum available resources" rule. Finally,
the model marries aspiration and attainability by committing both government
and people to a common norm of decent housing for all persons, and requiring
continuing progress toward the standard by the "progressive realization" prin-
ciple. Such an approach would respect foundational commitments of the legal
tradition, and preserve law's role as a "bridge... between those present aspira-
tions and our future. 22°
A domestic program for regulating housing quality and development built
around the progressive realization of standards would better balance the regu-
latory burden on diverse populations, the public interest in adequate housing,
and an aspirational commitment to elevating living standards in pursuit of so-
cial equality.22' Retooling a standard from international law for domestic appli-
cation fits with the globalized character of the social practices present in the
colonias. And to the extent that informality is linked more broadly to globaliza-
tion, any national effort to find regulatory tools appropriate to its character
should sensibly draw on international experiences, practices, and ideas. When
governments impose positive economic obligations on themselves, they do so
by a mechanism that incorporates attainability as a limiting principle. Where
states are the regulated parties, the ideal of the equality of nations means they
respect realistic differences among themselves in terms of resources available
for compliance. Is there any reason that domestic government should not limit
its powers in the same ways and extend the same respect for real difference
when it is dealing not with a peer nation, but instead with its people?
To encourage compliance with modified regulations and enforcement prac-
tices, local regulators can offer self-builders technical and financial assistance
as part of the long-term upgrading process. At any point when the household
seeks governmental assistance, the regulatory structure may assess whether it
has met the dual compliance obligations of continuous progress toward the
218. See The Problem of the Shanty, supra note 114, at 680 (suggesting this is the measure of
equality).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 111-28.
220. West, supra note 155, at 262-63.
221. The progressive realization model is a third way between the "crystals" and "mud" of Ameri-
can legal rules. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988)
(describing back-and-forth pattern of blurring clear and distinct property rules with muddy doctrines of
"maybe or maybe not," and reverse tendency to try to clear up blur with new crystalline rules).
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standard and the commitment of maximum available household resources. By
this approach, enforcement becomes a cooperative effort at progress rather than
a punishment of the poor for where they live or the limits of their resources.
Linked to such a comprehensive program of regularization, progressive re-
alization places law behind, rather than against the activities of informals,
without sacrificing legality or equality. Equality means that the government and
people recognize a single standard of housing adequacy and commit to under-
take progressive steps to realize it. Legality means that compliance is relative to
resources, and progress toward the standard is always required, even though
full realization may never be achieved.
CONCLUSION
Viewed from the perspectives of legality and equality, the subject of infor-
mality is a minefield. Even so, lawyers and legal scholars must take the lead in
formulating policy responses to informality. As this essay argues, informality is
a phenomenon defined not just by legal standards, regulation policy, and en-
forcement practice, but importantly by law's internal ideals.
By my skeptical claims in this essay about a conflict of interest between le-
gal ideals and informal realities, I do not wish to discourage constructive en-
gagement by legal scholars. Indeed, I hope to encourage and guide it. Particu-
larly within critical jurisprudential traditions, there exist theoretical and
methodological approaches that may allow engaged scholars to think a way
through the confounding obstacles of our shared legal culture.
In particular, theorizing about informality must build from the particular be-
fore reaching for the universal. Generalized and abstract concerns about legal-
ity and equality must be replaced by concrete engagement with the historical
and social particularities of the informal sector as it exists in our midst. Theory
that explains and predicts, and policy proposals that work, will stem from con-
crete social investigation and engagement; conversely, those that fail-or
worse, do active harm-will likely stem from preconceived ideological con-
ceptions. As such, informality takes on the force of a lived critique of our ex-
isting understandings as legal scholars.
To investigate the economic, social, and political contexts within which in-
formality develops and spreads, legal scholars must use interdisciplinary tools,
particularly those of the social sciences, including history, sociology, anthro-
pology, economics, geography, cultural and area studies. In this essay, I have
focused on the sociology and political economy of globalization as it impacts
the housing strategies of poor, mostly Latina/o, working populations at the
U.S.-Mexico border. Out of the effort to find some form by which law can en-
gage informality on its own terms emerges the "progressive realization" model.
It is an alternative model of the relationship between law and society that, not
coincidentally, corresponds to the analysis and strategic choices of those en-
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gaged in the struggle for survival in the colonias.
Within this particular socio-geography of economic restructuring, I have
argued, we can find threads of workable resistance strategies in the face of
globalization: Informality is proving an avenue of economic survival and even
wealth-creation for some workers hard-pressed by the new mandates of cheap
labor and privatized provision of the necessities of life.
Those threads snap easily, however, under the force of misguided law and
its enforcement. Social investigation can tell the story, and social theory can
connect it to larger structures of politics and economy. It is legal thinkers, how-
ever, who must bring that theory down to the ground in the shape of policy
frameworks and specific regulatory interventions.
